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A Return to the States’ Rights Model:   
Amending the Constitution’s Most Controversial  
and Misunderstood Provision 
MEG PENROSE 
This Article seeks to return to the intent of the Symposium, which was 
to stimulate a meaningful dialogue on the modern Second Amendment.  
More specifically, it proposes a return to the states’ rights model that 
predated the Supreme Court’s narrow decisions in District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago by using the Article V process set 
forth directly in the Constitution to address modern concerns about 
firearms.  The proposal flows from a healthy skepticism about the role of 
the federal government in interpreting gun regulations, as well as a desire 
to avoid the inevitable follow-up decisions from a very fractured and often 
unpredictable Supreme Court.  
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A Return to the States’ Rights Model: 
Amending the Constitution’s Most Controversial  
and Misunderstood Provision 
MEG PENROSE* 
“A mere change in public opinion since the adoption of the 
Constitution, unaccompanied by a constitutional amendment, 
should not change the meaning of the Constitution.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  THE DILEMMA 
The Second Amendment is a mere twenty-seven words, though most 
people only recognize the last fourteen of them: “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”2  What do these words, taken 
together, really mean?  And do they mean something different today than 
they did in the eighteenth century when they were first written, debated, 
rewritten, and, ultimately, ratified?  Can we, in the twenty-first century, 
rely solely on the text to ensure what the Second Amendment really 
protects? 
Before embarking on what will undoubtedly be a controversial 
proposal, I want to be clear that this Article is not anti-gun, anti-military, 
anti-American, or anti-anything.  Neither is the author, who is in the 
process of securing a concealed handgun license.  This proposal does not 
call for any governmental agency to disarm any individual or group of 
individuals.  Neither does the author.  Rather, the proposal takes a look at 
recent Second Amendment jurisprudence with a healthy skepticism about 
the role of the federal government—and particularly the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law.  Professor Penrose teaches 
Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, and other courses that relate to the Constitution.  She also 
actively practices constitutional law in federal court.  She recently completed citizen police training and 
is in the process of obtaining her concealed handgun license.  Professor Penrose is hugely indebted to 
her extended family for always indulging her by reading and commenting on her numerous drafts of 
her articles and essays.  In addition, Professor Penrose gratefully acknowledges the generous 
contributions from Professors Robert H. Churchill, Robert Cottroll, and Mark Tushnet.  Each of these 
gentlemen graciously provided advice and guidance in dealing with this complicated, checkered 
history.  Thank you to Dean Aric Short and other Texas A&M Law Professors for their support and 
friendship.   
1 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696–97 
(1976). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend II. 
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Court—in interpreting gun regulations.  And, contrary to criticism that 
followed the Symposium, the proposal does not undermine constitutional 
integrity or sanctity.  Instead, this proposal, which seeks a return to the 
states’ rights model that predated the Supreme Court’s narrow decisions in 
District of Columbia v. Heller3 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 uses the 
Article V process set forth directly in the Constitution to address modern 
concerns.5   
The Founders knew that society would change in ways they could 
never have imagined.  Thus, in their great design, they provided us with the 
means to change the Constitution in a manner that would enable this 
Constitution to outlive not only their grand vision but, likely, all of us and 
our vision as well.  The Article V process has been used on several 
occasions to provide us with twenty-seven amendments to the original 
Constitution.6  And, interestingly enough, the Second Amendment itself is 
a product of the Article V process.7   
To be clear, any desire by individuals or groups to amend our 
Constitution is not anti-American nor counter-culture.  Rather, Article V 
solutions are being asserted by scholars and groups on both the left and 
right sides of the political spectrum.  From the Goldwater Institute’s call 
for utilizing Article V to secure a Balanced Budget Amendment,8 to 
broader calls for holding a constitutional convention9 (something this 
author opposes), Article V appears to be gaining traction—or at least 
attention—in our modern society.   
Our federal system is broken and most Americans hold little faith in 
the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government.  Approval 
                                                                                                                          
3 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
4 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
5 See U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one 
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .”). Article V is the 
“Amendment” provision of the Constitution and affords modern generations the opportunity to update, 
correct, or otherwise alter our nearly 230-year-old Constitution. 
6 For a historical discussion of the Article V process and examples of its application, see generally 
S. DOC. No. 112-9, at 987–1001 (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-
2013/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2013.pdf. 
7 See Rod Taylor, Note, A New Look at Article V and the Bill of Rights, 6 IND. L. REV. 699, 705–
06 (1973) (discussing the reasons Article V was employed to amend the Bill of Rights). 
8 For various resources discussing the Goldwater Institute’s proposal, see Compact for a Balanced 
Budget, GOLDWATER INST. (Nov. 20, 2013), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/compact-balanced-
budget. 
9 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, What Are We to Do About Dysfunction? Reflections on Structural 
Constitutional Change and the Irrelevance of Clever Lawyering, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1127, 1132–33 
(2014) (contending that a constitutional convention is necessary, despite contrary arguments that 
judicial interpretations can safeguard evolving values).  
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ratings for these entities are nearing all-time lows.10  With no prospect of 
solutions being produced by the federal government, the promise of 
Article V and use of the state convention model appears enticing.  Our 
Constitution was intended to change and, in fact, it did change immediately 
upon ratification with the addition of a corresponding Bill of Rights.  This 
great promise, of an enduring yet adaptive Constitution, allows us to 
engage in healthy debate about the rights we hold dear.  We should seek 
ways to enshrine those rights more permanently in our Constitution, rather 
than wait for the fluctuating decisions of the Supreme Court to define a 
particular right’s parameters. 
Such robust debate was expected, if not encouraged, by the Founders.  
Unfortunately, modern society often chooses to forgo debate, choosing 
instead to use invectives and harassing communications to shut off 
uncomfortable conversations.  This Symposium attempted to jump start the 
healthy debate by inviting scholars and participants to discuss, debate, and 
assess the modern Second Amendment.  Unfortunately, immediately 
following this Symposium, many individuals either misunderstood the 
dialogue being shared or sought to advance a different agenda—one not 
interested in healthy debate or meaningful dialogue.   
This Article seeks to return to the Symposium’s intent, which was to 
stimulate a meaningful dialogue on the modern Second Amendment.  
Readers may disagree with the Article’s thesis, which proposes a return to 
the states’ rights model to avoid the inevitable follow-up decisions from a 
very fractured and sometimes unpredictable Supreme Court.  This author 
takes the states’ rights approach—one usually championed by many of the 
most ardent gun owners in this country.   
Hopefully, patience with the thesis will enable readers to appreciate 
that this Article is neither anti-gun nor anti-Constitution.  The author has 
most assuredly evolved since the Symposium and hopes that this Article 
will evidence her belief that states are in a far better position than the 
Supreme Court to delimit any restrictions placed on gun ownership or 
usage.  The author fears that if matters are left to the Supreme Court, any 
future restrictions will be far more limiting and, even worse, nationalized, 
despite local democratic movements that prefer differing regulations.  As a 
proud Texan, this Author believes that her state and all others are in far 
superior positions to assess their citizens’ local needs than the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Others are, of course, free to disagree. 
The Second Amendment is being used herein as a vehicle for 
discussing the broader issue of states’ rights.  Will we become a nation that 
has its most controversial and divisive issues decided at the state or 
                                                                                                                          
10 Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Trust in Government Generally Down this Year, GALLUP POL. 
(Sept. 26, 2013). 
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national level?  If we push them onto the national stage, we risk losing 
those rights that may seem clear from the text of the Constitution, but 
nevertheless are subject to interpretation from nine unelected Justices.  As 
Chief Justice Marshall admonished in McCulloch v. Maryland,11 the 
Constitution provides but an outline of our rights, subject, always, to being 
construed by the Supreme Court: 
A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the 
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all 
the means by which they may be carried into execution, 
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could 
scarcely be embraced by the human mind.  It would probably 
never be understood by the public.  Its nature, therefore, 
requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its 
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients 
which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of 
the objects themselves.  That this idea was entertained by the 
framers of the American constitution, is not only to be 
inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the 
language.  Why else were some of the limitations, found in 
the 9th section of the 1st article, introduced?  It is also, in 
some degree, warranted, by their having omitted to use any 
restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and 
just interpretation.  In considering this question, then, we 
must never forget that it is a Constitution we are 
expounding.12 
The Supreme Court, not the Constitution, established the concept of 
judicial review.13  Nowhere in the Constitution is this power set forth in the 
text, but the power has been firmly retained by the Court since its 
pronouncement in 1803 that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”14  Thus, as this Article 
unfolds, it can only be hoped that readers will appreciate the vantage point 
of the author: The Constitution will continue to be expounded by the 
Supreme Court.  Without clear protections for a states’ rights approach to 
gun ownership and rights, the Supreme Court will ultimately hold the final 
say regarding any particular regulation, state or federal.   
Such interpretive delegation is not favored by this author, particularly 
in light of the very tenuous nature of recent gun cases.  The Supreme Court 
did not declare that an individual right to “keep and bear arms” exists until 
                                                                                                                          
11 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
12 Id. at 407. 
13 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803). 
14 Id. at 177. 
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2008.15  That conclusion, made in a narrowly divided 5–4 decision,16 
suggests continuing uncertainty in our Second Amendment jurisprudence.  
While some might be content to rest upon the nascent case law, this author 
prefers keeping the power of regulation at the state level where local 
democracy is far better suited to meet the unique needs of each local 
population. Undoubtedly, questions of gun regulation and ownership will 
continue to be defined.  The current system, however, leaves the 
constitutionality of each regulation subject to Supreme Court review.  An 
amendment that returns the power of regulation to the states would insulate 
them from potential overreaching by any particular Supreme Court. 
For these reasons, this Author would like to see Article V used to 
return the issue of gun rights and regulations to the individual states.  The 
proffered amendment, as set forth herein, insures the continuing viability 
of lawful gun ownership.  The main alteration is that this proposal takes the 
power of judicial review regarding state regulations away from the 
Supreme Court.  Each of us must place our trust somewhere.  This author 
retains more trust in the local democracy of states’ rights. 
Scholars have called the Second Amendment “embarrassing,”17 
“ironic,”18 and “radical,”19 and have even noted the racist origins of gun 
control laws.20  Most Americans will tell you that the “right of the people 
to keep and bear arms” means that they have the constitutional right to 
own a gun.21  Such an understanding is incomplete, at best.22  Moreover, 
that view is arguably divorced from the text and history of the Second 
Amendment.23  One cannot possibly discuss the Second Amendment, what 
                                                                                                                          
15 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
16 Id. at 572. 
17 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).  Professor 
Levinson’s article remains the seminal scholarly piece on the Second Amendment.  Most scholars and 
historians credit Professor Levinson’s article with instigating the modern surfeit of Second Amendment 
scholarship. See Jill Lepore, The Lost Amendment, NEW YORKER (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/04/the-second-amendment.html (describing 
Levinson’s article as “a plea for reasoned debate” and designating it as one of several catalysts of 
renewed Second Amendment discourse).  
18 Saul Cornell, The Ironic Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 292 (2008). 
19 Eugene Volokh, The Radical Amendment, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2002, at A10. 
20 Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1995). 
21 74% Think Americans Have Constitutional Right to Own a Gun, 
RASMUSSEN REP. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_eve
nts/gun_control/74_think_americans_have_constitutional_right_to_own_a_gun. 
22 Historian Robert H. Churchill explains that there was undoubtedly a right to keep arms during 
colonial times.  That right, however, was directly connected to the duty of the “body politic” to remain 
prepared for armed militia duty.  Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right 
to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 
139, 141–42 (2007). 
23 Id. at 141–47.  “In every colony of British North America, militia laws required that these 
militiamen provide their own arms unless they were too poor to do so.  Taken together, probate 
inventories and extant militia returns and gun censuses demonstrate that most white men in American 
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it protects, or how to improve it without appreciating its origin.24 
This Article will delve into the origins, text, and early case law 
interpreting the Second Amendment to demonstrate that our modern 
understanding of these twenty-seven words has ventured so far from the 
Founders’ design that we must do something innovative to protect the 
rights we hold so dear.  We must, through the Article V amendment 
process, excise the first thirteen words that seem less relevant to our 
modern world.  Our twenty-first-century focus centers on the right “to keep 
and bear Arms,” wholly removed from the prefatory clause explaining that 
“a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,” 
requires something.25  What that something is no longer seems relevant 
because we are not living in the Founders’ world.  We do not have militias 
and really do not worry about whether these obsolescent forces are well or 
poorly regulated.  We care about guns.  Deeply.  Religiously.  And the 
current Second Amendment’s phraseology seems to only hinder our efforts 
to have meaningful conversations about the depth and breadth of an 
individual’s right “to keep and bear arms.”  We can continue on the path of 
affording the constitutional interpretation to the Supreme Court.  Or, we 
can adapt the Amendment to meet the needs of a much different, modern 
world. 
Part II of this Article traces the history of the founding generation, 
having been both victimized by and proponents of selective disarmament.  
Our current Second Amendment should have numerous footnotes attached 
to the fourteen words protecting the right to “keep and bear arms,” thereby 
ensuring that both lawyers and historians appreciate the true origin of this 
limited right.26  Regulations have always been a part of gun ownership in 
                                                                                                                          
owned guns . . . .”  Id. at 147.  Professor Churchill explains that most white males were expected, if not 
required, to “keep arms.”  Id. at 147–49.  The fact that Professor Churchill’s scholarship demonstrates a 
right to “keep arms” does not necessarily support the majority opinion in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, which suggests that keeping and bearing arms are and were intended to be synonymous.  554 
U.S. 570, 582–86 (2008).  Heller is where history and text may begin to part ways. 
24 It is also critical to note that at least one historian’s research has been roundly criticized for a 
lack of demonstrable accuracy.  Michael Bellesiles published regularly in this area, but has 
subsequently been challenged for his historical reliability.  See James Lindgren, Book Review, Fall 
From Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195, 2197 (2002) (“Since 
the book’s publication, scholars who have checked the book’s claims against its sources have 
uncovered an almost unprecedented number of discrepancies, errors, and omissions.”). 
25 U.S. CONST. amend II; see also Churchill, supra note 22, at 172 (“We have very few 
eighteenth-century commentaries on the meaning of the final draft of the Second Amendment.”). 
26 While Professor Churchill indicates that “at no time between 1607 and 1815 did the colonial or 
state governments of what would become the first fourteen states exercise a police power to restrict the 
ownership of guns by members of the body politic,” Churchill, supra note 22, at 142, this “body 
politic” strictly meant able-bodied white males.  The issue of ownership was quite clearly distinct from 
the issue of use as both colonial and state legislatures strictly regulated the use of weaponry.  White 
men could “keep arms” but they were not always free to “use” arms.  Id. at 172–74.   
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this country.27  The debate has never been about whether such ownership 
rights exist but, rather, which governmental entities are entrusted to 
promulgate regulations and interpret them. 
Part III introduces the “collective rights” and “standard model” 
approaches to Second Amendment analysis.  Each approach claims to have 
the more accurate view of history.  But, as we move further away from 
originalism and become more comfortable with a “living Constitution,” 
Part III inquires whether history really matters in this dialogue at all.  
These historical mysteries, or inconsistencies, merely give further credence 
to the need for amending and improving the Second Amendment to reflect 
the modern approach, all while returning power to the states rather than 
relying on the U.S. Supreme Court and its ever-changing composition. 
Part IV addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Heller and 
McDonald.  Prior to 2008, the Second Amendment had lain dormant for 
seven decades.28  The Court’s current treatment of the Second Amendment 
proves the vulnerability of leaving interpretation of our “living 
Constitution” solely to the province of the judicial department.  With a 
bitterly divided Supreme Court, it is likely that we have not heard its last 
word on the meaning of the Second Amendment.  This uncertainty should 
give pause to even the most ardent supporter of gun rights.   
Part V provides this author’s solution to the current Second 
Amendment dilemma.  Rather than battle over whether the Second 
Amendment’s militia clause means anything, the time has come to draft an 
entirely new amendment that protects lawful gun owners in a clear manner.  
Our current Second Amendment means only part of what it says, as a 
functioning Militia has long been absent from American society.  Our 
Founders provided us with the ideal tool to ameliorate outdated language, 
avoid confused interpretations, and modernize the protections afforded by 
our Constitution.  Article V was put in the Constitution to permit future 
generations to revise the Constitution to address concerns the Founders 
never could have envisioned or anticipated.  Article V gave us the Second 
Amendment.  Article V gave us the Bill of Rights.  While it may feel 
uncomfortable to rely on Article V, this author believes that Article V 
provides an excellent opportunity for modern society to improve our great 
Constitution, rather than continuing to rely upon the Supreme Court to 
define the parameters of lawful gun ownership. 
But first, we must convince ourselves that what remains in place is 
unworkable.  While many might disapprove of this proposal, I wonder 
whether anyone in this country is content or secure with relying on our 
                                                                                                                          
27 See id. at 143 (“Hundreds of individual statutes regulated the possession and use of guns in 
colonial and early national America.”). 
28 The last significant challenge to the Second Amendment was in United States v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 174 (1939). 
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current paradigm to interpret the Second Amendment.  The conversation 
about gun rights and regulations is growing more frequent.  Both sides 
want change and assurances, neither having found sufficient solace in the 
existing Second Amendment.  The author’s personal experience is that 
most individuals agree there is a pre-existing right to own weaponry, 
particularly guns.  But, as regulations persist in this area, we must ask 
which entity is best suited to solve the needs of the people and, 
particularly, lawful gun owners: the Supreme Court or state legislatures?  
The author’s answer to this question propels a states’ rights solution. 
II.  HISTORICAL REALITIES 
For all the cries of constitutional heritage, one thing is certain: the 
Second Amendment’s “right to keep and bear arms” was nowhere 
catalogued in the Declaration of Independence as a grievance against King 
George III.29  The Third Amendment’s quartering of soldiers was clearly 
articulated.30  The threat posed by standing armies was also mentioned.31  
There were even comments regarding the slave trade, later omitted.32  But, 
for all the claims of historical pedigree, the so-called individual right to 
“keep and bear arms”—currently disconnected from its contextual 
affiliation with the militia—was apparently not the impetus for calling 
forth the American Revolution.33 
                                                                                                                          
29 See Peter Buck Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 NW. U. 
L. REV. 46, 53 (1967) (“Apparently, no grievance leading or contributing to the [American] Revolution 
involved the disarming of an individual, and no evidence shows that either the populace or the 
revolutionary leaders conceived any individual right to bear arms as having been violated by British 
colonial policy.”). 
30 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 16 (U.S. 1776) (“For quartering large bodies 
of armed troops among us . . . .”). 
31 See id. at para. 13 (“He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the 
consent of our legislatures.”). 
32 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s “original Rough draught” of the Declaration of Independence, in 
1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1760–1776, at 423–28 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).  
Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration of Independence chastised King George III because: 
[H]e has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating it’s most sacred 
rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, 
captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur 
miserable death in their transportation thither.  this piratical warfare, the opprobrium 
of infidel powers, is the warfare on the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain, 
determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold . . . . 
Id. at 426.  These comments were later excised by the broader committee working on the Declaration of 
Independence.  Tania Tetlow, The Founders and Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 J. LOY. PUB. INT. 
L. 1, 11 (2001). 
33 See Feller & Gotting, supra note 29, at 53 (“The battles of Lexington and Concord were not 
engendered by the British intentions to disarm a single man, but rather their move to disarm the 
militia.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 109 (2002) 
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Instead, most historians and legal observers trace the roots of our 
Second Amendment back to the English Bill of Rights and the colonists’ 
fear of a standing army.34  Neither hunting nor self-protection, individually 
speaking, motivated the Founders to create the Second Amendment.35  
Rather, the right to arms—both English and colonial—stemmed from 
militia obligations and was always, absolutely always, conditioned on 
being an able-bodied, white male, usually of a particular religious faith.36  
Militias, it was believed, provided the best defense against standing armies 
and tyranny.37  
Fear likewise motivated another colonial stance toward weaponry: 
selective disarmament.  As suggested by the Declaration of Independence, 
which spoke disparagingly of the “Indian savages,”38 the Colonies 
distrusted Native Americans and outlawed them from having arms and 
munitions.39  Despite Thomas Jefferson’s initial statements of offense 
regarding slavery in the draft Declaration of Independence, blacks—both 
free and slave—were precluded from keeping or bearing arms due to a fear 
that their arming would undermine, if not abolish, the institution of 
                                                                                                                          
(explaining the connection between the Second Amendment and the desire to prevent the “king’s men” 
from having the only arms). 
34 E.g., Feller & Gotting, supra note 29, at 53. 
35 William G. Merkel, A Cultural Turn: Reflections on Recent Historical and Legal Writing on the 
Second Amendment, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 671, 680 (2006). 
36 For example, the Second Congress limited militia service to “each and every free able-bodied 
white male citizen . . . who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five 
years.”  Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271; see also United States v. Tooley, 717 F. 
Supp. 2d 580, 589 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (“While religious tolerance was higher in the colonies, at least 
some scholars believe that certain colonies disarmed their Catholic population.”). 
37 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The 
Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to 
maintain a well-regulated militia. . . . [as] a response to concerns raised during the ratification of the 
Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army 
posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several States.”).   
38 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 28 (U.S. 1776).  King George was condemned by 
colonists for exciting “domestic insurrections amongst us, and [endeavoring] to bring on the inhabitants 
of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished 
destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.”  Id. 
39 See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 319 (1991) (“The English distrust of the lower classes, 
and then certain religious groups, was replaced in America by a distrust of two racial minorities: Native 
Americans and blacks.”); David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic 
Context for the Historical Meaning of “the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 119, 152–53 (2004) (noting that New Hampshire had exempted “Quakers, Negroes, Indians, 
and Mulattoes, among others, from [state] militia service” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Cottrol 
and Diamond further explain that “an armed and universally deputized white population was necessary 
not only to ward off dangers from the armies of other European powers, but also to ward off attacks 
from the indigenous population.”  Cottrol & Diamond, supra, at 324. 
 1474 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1463 
slavery.40  Early Americans thus engaged in the same form of selective 
disarmament that English Protestants engaged in when disarming the 
Catholics.41  Targeted disarmament of discrete minority populations was 
regularly practiced both before and after the ratification of the Second 
Amendment.42  All of this illustrates that certain categories of people, 
though changing in description, have always been subjectively deemed too 
dangerous, too radical, or too unpredictable to have weaponry.43  Even 
today, Justice Scalia speaks of “the longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . [and] laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”44 
The Founders knew all too well that arms were power and 
disarmament kept mischief, particularly from “undesirable” individuals, at 
bay.45  So in many ways, fear—of a standing army and of the 
untrustworthy—was the motivation for early American gun laws.  While 
ironically clamoring for a right to “keep and bear arms” as a defense 
against tyranny, the Founders and colonial legislators ensured that those 
who might challenge the white hierarchy of our nascent democracy would 
not have access to the very weaponry that seemed so vital, at least 
rhetorically, to the nation’s survival.46  Our Constitution, in its original 
                                                                                                                          
40 See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 324 (“An armed white population was also essential 
to maintain social control over blacks and Indians who toiled unwillingly as slaves and servants in 
English settlements.” (footnote omitted)); supra note 32 (citing Jefferson’s remarks). 
41 Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of 
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should be Incorporated in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 398–403 (2009); Nelson Lund, The Past and 
Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 10–11(1996); see supra note 36 (observing 
that Catholics were likely disarmed by colonists). 
42 See United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 589 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (“It is apparently 
undisputed that other classes of early Americans, including Native Americans, free blacks, and those 
who refused to swear a loyalty oath, were often restricted from owning firearms.”).  Tooley presents an 
exceptional historical explanation of firearm regulation and the Second Amendment.  Id. at 587–92.   
43 Id. at 588–90.  Our English ancestors regularly disarmed individuals believed to be “dangerous 
to the Peace of the Kingdome.”  Id. at 589 (quoting Charles, supra note 41, at 365) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Likewise, “it is clear that the colonists, at least in some manner, carried on the English 
tradition of disarming those viewed as ‘disaffected and dangerous.’”  Id. at 590.  The tradition of taking 
firearms away from racial minorities persisted after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
through the black codes and Jim Crow laws.  Cramer, supra note 20, at 20–21.  In the 1960s, California 
was motivated by the Black Panthers’ open and armed protest activities to pass restrictive gun 
legislation.  Id. at 21. 
44 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
45 See Don Higginbotham, The Second Amendment in Historical Context, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
263, 267 (1999) (noting the legislative efforts to “disarm those socially undesirable persons such as 
Catholics, white servants, and Africans (both slaves and free blacks) who might somehow acquire 
weapons”). 
46 See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 319 (“The English distrust of the lower classes, and 
then certain religious groups, was replaced in America by a distrust of two racial minorities: Native 
Americans and blacks.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second Amendment and 
the Failure of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 184 (2000) (“The Second Amendment may 
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form, offered far from an egalitarian right to arms.47  While the lexicon 
suggests aspirations for “We the People,”48 a cursory evaluation of “the 
people” underscores how narrow the eighteenth-century definition was—
and was intended to be.  Our modern, post-Fourteenth Amendment society 
drastically alters this landscape. 
The Second Amendment, seen modernly as an individual protection of 
some variation, stood silent for decades while millions of Americans were 
purposefully disarmed and or otherwise restricted from carrying 
weapons.49  To recast the Second Amendment as a broad and inclusive 
right for all requires cognitive dissidence between our disarming past and 
our amnestic present.50  Or, to suggest this right is without limitation turns 
a blind eye to history.51  Justice Scalia acknowledges this past in the Heller 
case, noting: 
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.  From Blackstone through the 
19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely 
explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.  For example, the majority of the 19th-
century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions 
on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the 
                                                                                                                          
have been not merely ‘of the white people’ and ‘by the white people’ but also, at least to an extent, ‘for 
the white people.’”).    
47 See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 326–27 (noting that the colonial laws “reflected the 
desire to maintain white [male] supremacy and control”).   
48 U.S. CONST. pmbl.   
49 This author believes that there is, undoubtedly, an individual right component to the Second 
Amendment.  However, history suggests that the nature of that right was exclusive and generally 
conditioned on being of a particular race, gender, and station in life.  Thus, to suggest as the Supreme 
Court does in Heller that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all 
Americans,” 554 U.S. at 581, seems both fatally over- and under-inclusive.   
50 See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: 
Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 7–8 (1989) (stating that the old common 
law of England, which was adopted in large part by the American Colonies, contained no absolute right 
to have arms).  Ehrman and Henigan observed: 
A central thesis of opponents of strong firearms regulations is that the old common 
law of England supports a fundamental, personal right to be armed.  There is no 
dispute that the common law of England was in large part adopted by the American 
colonies, or that it was at least highly influential . . . . It is highly doubtful, however, 
that an absolute right to have arms was one of those rights or liberties.  The 
predominant, and better view, is that there was no such common law right. 
Id. 
51 This holds true even within the narrower militia-based context of the Second Amendment.  The 
term “white,” used to circumscribe the “able-bodied male citizens” federally compelled to enter militia 
service, was not removed from the federal militia law until 1862—a full seventy years after the 
ratification of the Second Amendment.  Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 1, 12 Stat. 597, 597. 
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Second Amendment or state analogues.52 
The right to keep and bear arms has always been burdened by 
regulations, although the types of limitations have changed over time.  
Thus, we must make peace with our embarrassing, ironic, radical, and 
limited Second Amendment.53  Or we could simply advance our rights as 
Americans to lawfully own and use firearms in a thoroughly modern 
Article V exercise. 
Historically, only five Supreme Court opinions have directly evaluated 
the Second Amendment.54  Only in the most recent two, Heller and 
McDonald, does one encounter a surprisingly contemporary approach to 
constitutional interpretation.55  For the first time in our constitutional 
history the Second Amendment provides an individual right to arms that is 
unconnected to militia service and disconnected from militia weaponry.56  
One of the last provisions of the Bill of Rights to be deemed incorporated, 
                                                                                                                          
52 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted). 
53 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.  
54 Prior to the Supreme Court’s two recent opinions, the Court had “handed down only three 
direct opinions on the Second Amendment, the last one coming in 1939.”  Higginbotham, supra note 
45, at 263.  The three cases preceding Heller and McDonald are United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 
(1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
55 The Georgia Supreme Court explained the classic Second Amendment interpretation—which 
remained the governing approach until 2008—as follows: 
Were this question [of what is meant by the right to “keep and bear arms”] entirely a 
new one, I should not myself hesitate to hold that the language of the constitution of 
this state, as well as that of the United States, guarantees only the right to keep and 
bear the “arms” necessary for a militiaman.  It is to secure the existence of a well 
regulated militia; that, by the express words of the clause, was the object of it, and I 
have always been at a loss to follow the line of thought that extends the guarantee to 
the right to carry pistols, dirks, Bowie-knives, and those other weapons of like 
character, which, as all admit, are the greatest nuisances of our day.  It is in my 
judgment a perversion of the meaning of the word arms, as used in the phrase “the 
right to keep and bear arms,” to treat it as including weapons of this character.  The 
preamble to the clause is the key to the meaning of it.  The word “arms,” evidently 
means the arms of a militiaman, the weapons ordinarily used in battle, to-wit: guns 
of every kind, swords, bayonets, horseman’s pistols, etc.  The very words, “bear 
arms,” had then and now have, a technical meaning.  The “arms bearing” part of a 
people, were its men fit for service on the field of battle.  That country was “armed” 
that had an army ready for fight.  The call “to arms,” was a call to put on the 
habiliments of battle, and I greatly doubt if in any good author of those days, a use 
of the word arms when applied to a people, can be found, which includes pocket-
pistols, dirks, sword-canes, toothpicks, Bowie-knives, and a host of other relics of 
past barbarism, or inventions of modern savagery of like character.  In what manner 
the right to keep and bear these pests of society, can encourage or secure the 
existence of a militia, and especially of a well regulated militia, I am not able to 
devine. 
Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474–75 (1874); see also United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 
1977) (noting the individual rights model “has long been rejected”).   
56 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
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the Second Amendment, was first found to apply to the individual states 
after nearly two hundred years of jurisprudence holding to the contrary, 
purportedly by the originalist wing of the Court.57  This thoroughly modern 
interpretation, based on the “individual rights” paradigm, is explained by 
Justice Scalia as follows: 
It should be unsurprising that such a significant matter has 
been for so long judicially unresolved.  For most of our 
history, the Bill of Rights was not thought applicable to the 
States, and the Federal Government did not significantly 
regulate the possession of firearms by law-abiding citizens.  
Other provisions of the Bill of Rights have similarly 
remained unilluminated for lengthy periods.  This Court first 
held a law to violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of speech in 1931, almost 150 years after the 
Amendment was ratified, and it was not until after World 
War II that we held a law invalid under the Establishment 
Clause.  Even a question as basic as the scope of proscribable 
libel was not addressed by this Court until 1964, nearly two 
centuries after the founding.  It is demonstrably not true that, 
as Justice Stevens claims, “for most of our history, the 
invalidity of Second-Amendment-based objections to 
firearms regulations has been well settled and 
uncontroversial.”  For most of our history the question did 
not present itself.58 
Our revolutionary Founders would find the individual rights model 
quite foreign, if not offensive.59  It bears noting that the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the incorporation of most portions of the Bill of Rights 
against the states was not the design of the Founders.  But for the 
ratification of Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment would only 
be a protection against the federal government—leaving many of the 
modern claims challenging excessive state regulation without any form of 
redress or recognition.  Gun regulation, in some form, existed in each of 
the individual states when the Second Amendment was ratified.60   
Further, the Founders were anything but populist when it came to 
weapons and the notions of who might be trusted with arms.  In this 
                                                                                                                          
57 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
58 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625–26 (citations omitted). 
59 See Higginbotham, supra note 45, at 267 (pointing out the possibility that “the Framers were 
most interested in citizens, possessing military style weapons, limited to military purposes, for 
employment only during their militia service”).   
60 See Churchill, supra note 22, at 143 (“Hundreds of individual statutes regulated the possession 
and use of guns in colonial and early national America.”); see also id. at 161–65 (describing gun 
regulations in early America).   
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manner, the Founders perpetuated our English heritage of discriminating 
between who could be trusted with weapons and who could not.61  
Blacks—both free and slave—Indians, non-Loyalists, Catholics, and other 
groups were selectively excluded from legal access to weaponry.62  Today, 
we continue to disarm those that society deems untrustworthy, such as 
felons,63 domestic abusers,64 minors,65 and individuals with severe mental 
illness.66  Disarmament is part of our country, our history, and our heritage 
relating to guns, but regulations should not, in any manner, be disarming 
those that are trustworthy and capable of lawfully owning guns. 
Today, some two centuries beyond the Second Amendment, we find 
ourselves at the juncture of another modern revolution.  The modern 
revolution is not one seeking freedom or democracy.  The issues are not 
slavery, savages, or standing armies.67  Rather, the modern revolution is 
how to deal with an armed populace seemingly detached from the original 
                                                                                                                          
61 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, provided the English ancestry of the Second 
Amendment as follows: 
Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings Charles II 
and James II succeeded in using select militias loyal to them to suppress political 
dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents.  Under the auspices of the 1671 
Game Act, for example, the Catholic Charles II had ordered general disarmaments 
of regions home to his Protestant enemies.  These experiences caused Englishmen to 
be extremely wary of concentrated military forces run by the state and to be jealous 
of their arms.  They accordingly obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in 
the Declaration of Right (which was codified as the English Bill of Rights), that 
Protestants would never be disarmed: “That the Subjects which are Protestants may 
have Arms for their Defense suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law.”  
This right has long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second 
Amendment. 
554 U.S. at 592–93 (citations omitted).  Thus, disarmament is, at its core, a significant component of 
our firearms-related heritage. 
62 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
63 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). 
64 Id. § 922(g)(8). 
65 Id. § 922(x)(2).  For an early example of a court upholding bans on the arming of minors, see 
State v. Callicutt, 69 Tenn. 714, 716–17 (1878). 
66 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“Although we do not undertake an 
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the 
mentally ill . . . .”). 
67 See Merkel, supra note 35, at 682–83 (underscoring the paradox between the colonial reticence 
of standing armies and our modern affinity for the world’s most impressive military force).  Professor 
Merkel argues that today, “[w]e have grown to like military contractors and overseas military 
adventures and to live with high taxes and huge deficits.  We want military bases in our neighborhoods.  
We fight to keep them from closing just as New Englanders of 1775 fought to shut them down.”  Id. at 
683. 
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meaning of the Second Amendment.68  How are we to analyze laws 
restricting guns and munitions or calling for universal background checks?  
How can we constitutionally confront mass shootings and the tragic 
legacies of Tucson, Aurora, and Newtown while zealously protecting the 
rights of lawful gun owners, including the right to concealed carry?  Do 
“stand your ground” laws truly have grounding in the Second 
Amendment’s militia focus?  And, even though “open carry” laws were not 
tolerated for much of our history, they are a staple in many states today, 
including the author’s home state of Texas.  Open carry laws, regardless of 
historical views, should not be made dependent on national tolerance or the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation, but rather, should remain firmly 
protected in the local democracy of state legislators.   
 Questions regarding the breadth of Second Amendment rights have 
been partially answered, but the answers are still subject to fierce debate 
and continuing interpretation.  The current solution feels vulnerable, even 
fleeting.69  Perhaps a better solution to these issues lies in the text of the 
original Constitution rather than the incomprehensible meaning of the 
Second Amendment’s twenty-seven words.70  Can Article V provide the 
solace needed for both sides of the modern debate?71  
This author’s solution to the Second Amendment conundrum is simple, 
yet perhaps feels uncomfortable.  History has not resolved the issue; 
scholars have not resolved the issue.72  And, with a closely divided 
                                                                                                                          
68 See Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 166 
(2004) (“The right protected by the Second Amendment was one enjoyed by citizens who used their 
privately owned weapons in a well-regulated militia.”).  
69 Heller was a narrow 5–4 decision.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 572.  And McDonald was even more 
fragmented with a 4–1–4 plurality opinion.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 
(2010).   
70 See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 103, 111 (2000) (“Our quest to discover a perfect syntax and vocabulary for [these] twenty-
seven words thus risks ascribing to a general statement of principle a measure of legal exactitude it was 
never conceived to carry.”). 
71 Cf. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 137 (1943) (“The constitutional fathers, fresh 
from a revolution, did not forge a political strait-jacket for the generations to come.  Instead they wrote 
Article V . . . . Article V contains procedural provisions for constitutional change by amendment 
without any present limitation whatsoever except that no State may be deprived of equal representation 
in the Senate without its consent.”). 
72 E.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3121 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer wrote: 
The Court based its conclusions almost exclusively upon its reading of history.  But 
the relevant history in Heller was far from clear: Four dissenting Justices disagreed 
with the majority’s historical analysis.  And subsequent scholarly writing reveals 
why disputed history provides treacherous ground on which to build decisions 
written by judges who are not expert at history.  Since Heller, historians, scholars, 
and judges have continued to express the view that the Court’s historical account 
was flawed.  
Id. 
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Supreme Court, any resolution that may appear secure now is tenuous at 
best.  Should lawful gun owners leave their rights to the chance 
interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court?  The recent 5–4 and plurality 
decisions regarding the Second Amendment illustrate how evanescent 
current case law may be.  The change of a single Justice could overturn the 
entire doctrine.   
While many Americans resist changing our Constitution, being 
understandably proud of its enduring nature, the Founders envisioned 
precisely this quandary and provided us a protective tool in Article V.73  
Perhaps the time has come to use the Founders’ tool to protect against 
Judicial overreach.  Perhaps the time has come to amend the Second 
Amendment with a states’ rights model that returns power to the state 
legislatures rather than the federal government.  Our constitutional 
paradigm places the ultimate authority for interpreting constitutional 
questions with the Supreme Court.  A thoughtful amendment to the Second 
Amendment that returns the power of regulating lawful gun owners to our 
state legislators could offer the best compromise between those seeking 
regulation and those wanting full protection to lawfully own and use guns.  
The solution may sound revolutionary.  But, in fact, the tool being 
suggested is one the Founders provided and one that others recognizing the 
potential for judicial overreach in our broken federal system are also 
embracing.  
III.  THE TOOLS OF THE LAWYER 
[Originalism’s] greatest defect, in my view, is the difficulty 
of applying it correctly. . . . [W]hat is true is that it is often 
exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of 
an ancient text.  Properly done, the task requires the 
consideration of an enormous mass of material—in the case 
of the Constitution and its Amendments, for example, to 
mention only one element, the records of the ratifying 
debates in all the states.  Even beyond that, it requires an 
evaluation of the reliability of the material—many of the 
                                                                                                                          
73 Article V reads, in pertinent part, as follows:   
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures 
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid as to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by the Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by Congress . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought to 
be quite unreliable.  And further still, it requires immersing 
oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the 
time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have 
which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, 
philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of 
our day.  It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the 
historian than the lawyer.74 
When the Supreme Court decided United States v. Heller, it did so 
using the tools of the lawyer, rather than the historian.  The Supreme Court 
utilized this approach despite Justice Scalia’s own admonishment that 
when seeking to interpret the original meaning of our Constitution’s 
amendments, the task is “sometimes better suited to the historian than the 
lawyer.”75  This author is conflicted, recognizing that history has a 
chameleon-like quality, often changing to suit the needs of a particular 
time or a particular situation.76  But, a Constitution should not be so elastic.  
When it becomes so—varying in interpretation depending on the viewpoint 
of the interpreter—perhaps the time has come to change its meaning 
through amendment rather than historical interpretation or judicial caprice.  
Before embarking on such a rarely traveled path, however, perhaps we 
should heed the words of Justice Scalia and review the works of the 
historians and lawyers. 
A.  Competing Historical Models  
Current Second Amendment scholarship can be divided into two 
distinct camps: the self-proclaimed “standard model,”77 which embraces an 
individual right to keep and bear arms,78 and the more traditional 
                                                                                                                          
74 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (1989). 
75 Id. at 857. 
76 Cf. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 613–15 (2008) 
(noting that the further society moves “from the time of adoption, the more likely it is that assertions 
about then-contemporary public meaning will not track the public meaning at the time of adoption”).   
77 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 
466 (1995) (defining the Second Amendment as rooted in “an individual right to keep and bear arms”).  
Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds, a constitutional law scholar, coined the phrase “standard model,” 
explaining that “there is sufficient consensus on many [Second Amendment] issues that one can 
properly speak of a ‘Standard Model’ in Second Amendment theory, much as physicists and 
cosmologists speak of a ‘Standard Model’ in terms of the creation and evolution of the Universe.”  Id. 
at 463.  However, historians, like Professor Jack N. Rakove, express some indignation toward those 
“march[ing] under the banner of the self-proclaimed ‘standard model.’”  Rakove, supra note 70, at 103. 
78 See, e.g., Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2009) (remarking that “[f]or most of its history the 
Second Amendment was understood to confer an individual right”).  Notably, the author did not 
support this statement with a citation.  For articles written by other standard model scholars, see 
Clayton E. Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson & George A. Mocsary, “This Right Is Not Allowed by 
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“collective rights” model, which is urged more by historians than 
lawyers.79  However, these two approaches are not, and should not be, the 
only options in evaluating the Second Amendment.80  Historians continue 
their assault against the standard model, protesting that its scholars at times 
demonstrate a selective81 approach toward history.82  The standard model 
may be more aptly called the “twenty-first-century model,” as a thorough 
review of case law, statutory evolution, and nineteenth-83 and early 
twentieth-century scholarship84 suggests the standard model is, in some 
                                                                                                                          
Governments that Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the Second Amendment When the 
Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.  823 (2010); Stephen P. Halbrook, What 
the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 151 (1986); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 144–45 (1986); David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the 
Twentieth Century—and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527 (2012); 
Reynolds, supra note 77; and Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 793 (1998). 
79 Merkel, supra note 35, at 676.  Professor Merkel notes that he and others have urged a more 
centrist position, “acknowledging that the right to arms was intended to attach to individuals, but 
stressing that it was also understood to serve overwhelmingly public purposes rather than private ones 
such as personal self-defense or the needs of hunters.”  Id. 
80 Id.; see also Amar, supra note 33, at 103 (arguing that both individual rights and states’ rights 
proponents are wrong in their interpretation of the Second Amendment); Cornell, supra note 68, at 161 
(suggesting that neither the individual rights view nor the collective rights view is the appropriate 
paradigm to think about the Second Amendment).   
81 One such “selective” example is Professor Malcolm’s unsupported statement that “American 
society trusted the good sense of ordinary citizens in permitting them to be armed.”  Malcolm, supra 
note 78, at 1381.  This statement does not contain any citation so it is difficult to appreciate what is 
being referenced.  As her article demonstrates, the Founders aggressively sought to disarm—out of 
distrust—Native Americans and African-Americans, both free and slave.  See id. (describing the 
growing distrust emerging in the early twentieth century that led to discriminatory state laws limiting 
some individual’s gun rights).  Further, her article confirms that nearly every state has had laws that 
keep weapons out of the hands of those deemed untrustworthy or those weapons deemed more 
dangerous than sensible.  See id. at 1381–82 (providing examples of state and municipal laws which 
restrict ownership of firearms). 
82 See Merkel, supra note 35, at 685 (chastising the legal academy’s deficient history by stating 
that “much of the history that supplies the allegedly empirical basis for Second Amendment theorizing 
cannot be taken seriously on its own terms, and would be censured in any vigorous undergraduate 
program even in an educational milieu otherwise committed to positive reinforcement”). 
83 See John F. Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defense, 1 CENT. 
L.J. 259, 259–61 (1874) (providing examples of cases involving the right to bear arms from the 
nineteenth century). 
84 See Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 
473, 476–77 (1915) (urging that the Second Amendment “should be construed in connection with the 
well-known objection to standing armies and the general belief in the need and sufficiency of a well-
regulated militia for the defense of the people and the state” rather than an individual rights model); 
George I. Haight, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 31, 31 (1941) (“The right . . . 
must be read in keeping with the context which indicates the purpose of the right, namely: to secure the 
maintenance of a well-regulated militia.”); Daniel J. McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12 
MARQ. L. REV. 138, 143 (1928) (“Judging from the prevailing trend of the cases, it would seem as if 
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measure, ahistorical.85  In determining the breadth of the Second 
Amendment, “[n]o coherent intention or understanding of the existence 
and scope of a private, individual right to keep and bear arms could [have 
been historically] derived, because that question did not present itself for 
public debate in the form in which we now know it.”86  The aim of the 
Second Amendment, pure and simple, was the ability to retain militias as a 
guard against tyranny.87  As one scholar exclaims, “The Framers 
envisioned Minutemen bearing guns, not Daniel Boone gunning bears.”88  
The twenty-first-century prism of individual rights used by the 
standard model scholars does not adequately appreciate the limited nature 
of individual rights during the colonial period; nor does it accurately 
portray custom and legislation that governed a society fearful of standing 
armies and lacked a professional police force.89  We are ill-equipped to 
appreciate the colonists’ dedication to militias preserved in the Second 
Amendment.  The vernacular of “hue and cry,” “musket,” and “firelock” is 
as foreign to us as the notion of “substantive due process” and 
“incorporation” would be to our Founders.  Claims that the Second 
Amendment permitted everyone to own weaponry would be an affront to 
eighteenth-century mores.  The Founders would likely challenge the notion 
that the government could not register weaponry or prohibit gun 
ownership.90  Unlike modern Americans, the founding generation endured 
mandatory gun registration as a basis for ensuring a functional militia, and 
routinely disarmed those considered threatening to the established social 
order.91  Individual rights, as such, were far more limited in colonial 
America than those that exist now.  Post-Fourteenth Amendment, our 
society is one that embraces individualism and personal liberties—from 
gun ownership to claims of reproductive freedom.  Such a constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
the Second Amendment only forbids Congress so to disarm citizens as to prevent them from 
functioning as state militia men.”). 
85 See Cornell, supra note 68, at 161 (challenging that “[w]hile this neat dichotomy furthers the 
interests of those involved in modern political debates about gun policy, it is not particularly useful for 
understanding the eighteenth-century world in which the Second Amendment was drafted and 
adopted”); see also Rakove, supra note 70, at 111–12 (suggesting that the Founders only considered 
the militia—and not individual rights—in their public debates when enacting the Second Amendment). 
86 Rakove, supra note 70, at 112. 
87 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008).   
88 Amar, supra note 33, at 106.  
89 Id.; see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 34–35 (explaining that the militias “gave the 
states a source of internal police power”); Lund, supra note 41, at 7 (describing how the Crown, like 
the Colonies, “lacked the financial resources to maintain a permanent army or police force”). 
90 Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, THE ATLANTIC 
(July    24,    2011),        http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-
guns/308608/?single_page=true. 
91 Id.; see also Rakove, supra note 70, at 110 (“The American colonies and states were not a 
libertarian utopia; their traditions of governance permitted legislatures and institutions of local 
government to act vigorously in the pursuit of public health and safety.”). 
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paradigm would have been quite unthinkable in the colonial era. 
Our Founders feared, above most other issues, two things: (1) a 
standing army, having lived through King George’s quartering of soldiers 
in colonial homes; and (2) governmental tyranny.92  These fears were 
classically English and date back to the ouster of James II during the 
Glorious Revolution.  While the standard model scholars speak of the 
English Bill of Rights as if it were comparable to our Bill of Rights, a 
contextual review of the ascension of William and Mary to the English 
throne demonstrates, quite clearly, that the motivations behind the so-
called English Bill of Rights were the same grievances that our Founders 
placed in the Declaration of Independence: governmental tyranny, 
contempt for standing armies, and disdain for the quartering of soldiers in 
citizens’ homes.93  The disarmament issue was intimately tied to these 
primary issues with militias proffering the first line of collective, 
communal defense.94  Militias were a critical part of early America.95  
Today, modern Americans embrace our impressive military without a fear 
that soldiers will be forced to take refuge in our homes.  Further, we rely 
on our soldiers to keep us safe from all threats to our security and liberty 
and regularly celebrate the standing military that is part of the fabric of this 
great nation. 
Through this eighteenth-century lens—one where the Bill of Rights 
was intended to limit the federal government from encroaching on states’ 
rights—scholars should appreciate the limited approach to colonial-era 
“rights.”96  Rights in 1787 and 1791 were vastly cabined in contrast to 
rights as we speak of them today.97  To modernize, or revise, history by 
urging the contemporary viewpoint of a post-Fourteenth Amendment Bill 
of Rights as securing “my individual rights,” is to alter both the colonial 
viewpoint and experience.98  It is an attempt to modernize their eighteenth-
                                                                                                                          
92 Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical 
Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 205 (2000) (“According to the traditional Whig and 
Republican ideology of this period, a standing army threatened the liberties of a free people.  This 
argument was rooted in English history . . . .”). 
93 Finkelman, supra note 92, at 205–06; see also Roy Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed 
Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 977–79 
(1975). 
94 See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 226 (observing that any “right” to own weapons, as such, was 
collective in nature, always being related to an individual’s service in a “well regulated militia” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
95 Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 6 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 263 
(2000). 
96 Finkelman, supra note 92, at 233. 
97 See Higginbotham, supra note 45, at 267 (“Given deep-seated beliefs about the corporate 
nature of society and mercantile practices, provincial lawmakers would have considered nineteenth-
century liberalism or laissez-faire notions unthinkable.”).   
98 See Cornell, supra note 68, at 164 (discussing an “alternative Second Amendment universe” to 
criticize the historical approach of the “standard model” scholars). 
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century Constitution to fit our twenty-first-century needs in an attempt to 
conform to the post-Fourteenth Amendment living Constitution. 
B.  Regulations vs. Rights  
Traditionally, the “right” to keep and bear arms was more properly 
considered a duty for able-bodied white males to be prepared to defend 
one’s community in cases of aggression or insurrection.99  The twenty-
first-century individualistic paradigm and vernacular of “my rights” did not 
exist in either English or early American history.100  An “individual right,” 
to the extent such right existed, was recognized in colonial America more 
in the civic, communal sense and was generally tied to militia service.101  
State police power, in its most literal application, easily trumped individual 
rights.102  Colonists and early nineteenth-century Americans appreciated 
that weapons were to be regulated, often registered, limited, or wholly 
prohibited.103  They also appreciated that a large segment of the 
population—women, Indians, slaves, free blacks, and resident aliens—
would have been openly denied this so-called “right.”104  Nearly all 
states—either constitutionally or legislatively—retained the right to 
regulate weaponry, to determine which individuals were qualified to keep 
or bear arms, and to completely proscribe concealed weapons through the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.105   
Gun regulations and proscriptions were commonplace in the nineteenth 
                                                                                                                          
99 See Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right 
to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 572 
(2006) (describing the colonial militia experience as a civic versus an individual right). 
100 Cornell, supra note 68, at 164–65.   
101 Id.  Cornell explains that such a civic right “was inextricably linked to the obligation to 
participate in communal defense as part of a well-regulated militia.”  Id. at 165.  Further, while 
“[w]omen, free Africans, and resident aliens might claim a genuinely individual right such as the right 
of religious conscience . . . they were not included among those who bore arms.”  Id.  
102 See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 70, at 127 (explaining that the Framers rejected their opportunity 
to curb police power and state authority in regard to the individual’s right to bear arms).  “Neither at 
Philadelphia nor New York would it have occurred to anyone to ask whether adoption or amendment of 
the Constitution would diminish the capacity of state and local governments, in the exercise of their 
conventional police powers, to impose legislative restrictions on the use or ownership of firearms.”  Id. 
103 See Churchill, supra note 22, 161 (observing that colonial laws “required militiamen and other 
householders to bring their guns to the muster field twice a year so that militia officers could record 
which men in the community owned guns” and that “[s]ome colonies authorized door-to-door surveys 
of gun ownership”).   
104 Cornell, supra note 68, at 165. 
105 Rakove, supra note 70, at 110.  Professor Rakove notes that “our reading of the Second 
Amendment is conditioned by the results of an era (or several eras) of modern rights-oriented 
jurisprudence which naturally assumes that bills of rights exist to create legally enforceable immunities 
against the coercive power of the state.”  Id. 
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and early twentieth centuries.106  The Second Amendment imposed no 
impediment.  Historian Saul Cornell credits Kentucky as being the first 
American state to curb the carrying of concealed weapons.107  Violations 
carried a fine of up to $100, a substantial sum in 1813.108  That same year, 
Louisiana passed a similar statute that made it a capital offense to kill or 
disable another person using a concealed weapon.109  Indiana and other 
states soon followed suit, including prohibitions passed in Georgia, 
Virginia, Alabama, and Ohio between the years 1820 and 1859.110   
In 1872, the Supreme Court of Texas used very strong language to find 
the Second Amendment inapplicable to its deadly weapon statute: 
To refer the deadly devices and instruments called in the 
statute “deadly weapons,” to the proper or necessary arms of 
a “well-regulated militia,” is simply ridiculous.  No kind of 
travesty, however subtle or ingenious, could so misconstrue 
this provision of the constitution of the United States, as to 
make it cover and protect that pernicious vice, from which so 
many murders, assassinations, and deadly assaults have 
sprung, and which it was doubtless the intention of the 
legislature to punish and prohibit.  The word “arms” in the 
connection we find it in the constitution of the United States, 
refers to the arms of a militiaman or solider, and the word is 
used in its military sense.111   
The prevailing sentiment among courts and state legislatures was that 
this militia-based approach was settled law.112  Concealed weapons laws, 
proscriptions against possessing a concealed weapon in the home, and 
other regulations passed under traditional police powers were regularly 
enforced; this was true in Arkansas,113 Indiana,114 Georgia,115 Ohio,116 
                                                                                                                          
106 See, e.g., United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942) (noting that “[w]eapon 
bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right by the common law,” and describing 
various state and federal regulations pertaining to dangerous weaponry), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). 
107 Cornell, supra note 99, at 584.  As Cornell describes, Kentucky “forbade anyone but travelers 
from carrying ‘[a] pocket pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon.’”  Id. 
(quoting Acts Passed at the First Session of the Twenty First General Assembly for the Commonwealth 
of Kentucky 100–11 (1813)). 
108 Id.   
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 585. 
111 English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 477 (1872). 
112 See, e.g., United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing cases which 
“have analyzed the second amendment purely in terms of protecting state militias, rather than 
individual rights”). 
113 See Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876) (approving a concealed weapon law after the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment); Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101 (1872) (“[A] constitutional 
right to bear arms in defense of person and property does not prohibit the legislature from making such 
police regulations as may be necessary for the good of society, as to the manner in which such arms 
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Kansas,117 Oklahoma,118 Delaware,119 Missouri,120 Tennessee,121 North 
Carolina,122 Pennsylvania,123 Alabama,124 Texas,125 and Massachusetts,126 
among others. 
Unsuccessful court challenges to gun regulations helped cement the 
notion that the Second Amendment did not apply to the individual states.127  
Courts universally found that state and federal gun restrictions were 
                                                                                                                          
shall be borne.  Neither natural nor constitutional right authorizes a citizen to use his own property or 
bear his own arms in such a way as to injure the property or endanger the life of his fellow 
citizen . . . .”); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 18, 28 (1842) (finding that the defendant should have been 
indicted for violating the state concealed carry law). 
114 State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229, 229 (Ind. 1833). 
115 See Strickland v. State, 72 S.E. 260, 260, 269 (Ga. 1911) (upholding an act proscribing the 
carrying of a pistol or revolver post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification); Brown v. State, 39 S.E. 873, 
873–74 (Ga. 1901) (upholding a concealed weapons law even against a person maintaining a concealed 
weapon in the privacy of his own home). 
116 See State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 663, 665 (Ohio 1920) (overturning a “[n]ot guilty” verdict 
where a weapon proscription was applied in the home). 
117 See City of Salinas v. Blaskey, 83 P. 619, 621 (Kan. 1905) (“The right to keep and bear arms 
for the common defense does not include the right to associate together as a military organization, or to 
drill and parade with arms in cities or towns, unless authorized to do so by law.”). 
118 See Ex parte Thomas, 97 P. 260, 262 (Okla. 1908) (“Practically all of the states under 
constitutional provisions similar to ours have held that acts of the Legislatures against the carrying of 
weapons concealed did not conflict with such constitutional provision denying infringement of the right 
to bear arms, but were a valid exercise of the police power of the state.”). 
119 See State v. Quail, 92 A. 859, 859 (Del. 1914) (finding an individual guilty of carrying a 
concealed weapon even though the revolver was unloaded). 
120 See State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 528–29 (1881) (“The law prohibiting the wearing of 
concealed weapons, is a police regulation for the protection of society and not an infringement of the 
constitutional right to bear arms.  It does not prohibit the right to bear arms, but provides that they shall 
not be worn in a manner dangerous to the welfare of society.”); see also State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468, 
469 (Mo. 1886) (“The right of the legislature to prohibit the wearing of concealed weapons, under state 
constitutions in many respects like our own, is now generally conceded.”). 
121 See State v. Burgoyne, 75 Tenn. 173, 174, 179 (1881) (sustaining a conviction for the sale of 
pistols post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 159 (1840) 
(finding only militia weapons to be free from state regulation).  
122 See State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697, 700–01 (1882) (sustaining a conviction for carrying a 
concealed weapon, even though the purpose of carrying the weapon was self-protection). 
123 See McMillen v. Steele, 119 A. 721, 722 (Pa. 1923) (discussing the prohibition of sale of guns 
to minors). 
124 See State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 621–22 (1840) (upholding a law banning concealed weapons 
because only weapons that were carried openly served the purpose of defending a person and the state). 
125 See English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478–79 (1872) (discussing the legislature’s right to regulate 
the privilege granted by the Second Amendment). 
126 See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138, 138 (Mass. 1896) (upholding a law prohibiting 
the non-militia-affiliated marching and drilling with firearms post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification). 
127 See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (“The right to keep and 
bear arms is not a right conferred upon the people by the federal constitution.  Whatever rights in this 
respect the people may have depend upon local legislation; the only function of the Second 
Amendment being to prevent the federal government and the federal government only from infringing 
that right.”); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
the Second Amendment does not apply to the states). 
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perfectly legal.128  As the Third Circuit noted in 1942: 
Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an 
absolute right by the common law.  It was regulated by 
statute as to time and place as far back as the Statute of 
Northampton in 1328 and on many occasions since.  The 
decisions under the State Constitutions show the upholding 
of regulations prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, 
prohibiting persons from going armed in certain public places 
and other restrictions, in the nature of police 
regulations . . . .129 
These regulations were routinely upheld despite the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.130  Whatever its protection against federal 
encroachment, until 2010, the Second Amendment was impotent against 
challenges to state regulations.131 
History changed dramatically in 2008 and 2010 when the Supreme 
Court provided a decidedly modern interpretation to the Second 
Amendment.132  Gone is any reliance on the Statute of Northampton, a 
fourteenth-century law prohibiting English citizens from going or riding 
“armed by night or by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of 
Justices or other Ministers.”133  We are no longer damned to retain the 
legacy of an English Bill of Rights that disarmed the Catholics, who had 
first disarmed the Protestants, noting that “the subjects which are 
Protestants, may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions 
                                                                                                                          
128 See United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266–67 (3d Cir. 1942) (“[T]his amendment, unlike 
those providing for protection of free speech and freedom of religion, was not adopted with individual 
rights in mind, but as a protection for the States in the maintenance of their militia organizations against 
possible encroachments by the federal power.”), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).  The most notable 
exception, Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90 (Ky. 1822), was considered by nearly every state court to 
be a remarkable outlier.  See, e.g., State v. Keet, 190 S.W. 573, 574–75 (Mo. 1916) (“[Bliss] has never 
been cited with approval, but has often been disapproved.”); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 
160 (1840) (“We are aware that the court of appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Bliss v. 
Commonwealth . . . [decided that legislation which prohibited concealed weapons] is unconstitutional 
and void.  We have great respect for the court by whom that decision was made, but we cannot concur 
in their reasoning.”). 
129 Tot, 131 F.2d at 266. 
130 See, e.g., Quilici, 695 F.2d at 269–70 (holding that the right to keep and bear arms is so limited 
by a state’s police power that a ban on handguns did not violate the right). 
131 See, e.g., id. (holding that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states and the state is 
free to regulate gun laws using its police power). 
132 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. 
Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states by virtue 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
133 Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 8. 
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and as allowed by law.”134  We are now free to recognize that the historical 
model, built on muskets and militias, is unworkable and can transition to a 
Constitution that promises individual protections and freedoms through a 
vibrant, nearly fully incorporated Fourteenth Amendment.  The time is ripe 
for us to break free from an uncertain history that has proven ill-equipped 
to meet the needs of its twenty-first-century citizens keeping and bearing 
twenty-first-century weaponry. 
Article V, which outlines the constitutional amendment process, 
permits us to modernize our constitutional approach toward weaponry 
without doing injustice to our history.135  We can accept the truth that what 
was relevant for colonial America is no longer relevant for us today, 
particularly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We do not 
rely on militias.  We do not own muskets or slaves.  Women have secured 
the right to work and vote.  Individual rights and freedoms “emanate” from 
the “penumbras” of our brilliant Constitution,136 though those emanations 
continue to be first articulated by our Supreme Court.  This ability to 
“expound” individual rights is not found directly in any portion of our 
Constitution but continues to find its source in judicial review, with rights 
being enlarged or constricted often based upon the composition of the 
Supreme Court and its view of history.137  Our modern world is struggling 
with the Second Amendment, but not because we do not understand what it 
                                                                                                                          
134 Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43 (1971)); see also id. (“[T]here is little historical support for the idea that 
the English Bill of Rights was attempting to ensure some absolute right of individuals to have arms.  
Instead, the focus of this section of the Bill of Rights was a conflict between Protestants and Catholics 
over respective roles in the militia and the army.”). 
135 See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 137 n.15 (1943) (“Writing in 1816 Jefferson 
said: ‘Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the 
covenant, too sacred to be touched.  They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than 
human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment.  I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and 
labored with it.  It deserved well of its country.  It was very like the present, but without the experience 
of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of bookreading; and this 
they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent 
and untried changes in laws and constitutions.  I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; 
because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting 
their ill effects.  But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of 
the human mind.  As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, 
new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions 
must advance also, and keep pace with the times.  We might as well require a man to wear still the coat 
which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous 
ancestors.’” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37, 42–43 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899))). 
136 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (writing that “specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance).  Griswold opened the door to a new era of “individual rights” that continues to 
grow, even to this day.  E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
137 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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meant.  Rather, we are struggling because we do not know, 
constitutionally-speaking, how to properly modernize its application.  This 
author would urge that we forego the continuing historical debates, accept 
the Second Amendment’s fallibilities, and create a more workable solution 
using Article V’s proffered tool.  The time has come to take control of our 
destiny to ensure continued gun ownership by lawful gun owning citizens.  
Relying upon statutes from the fourteenth century as a basis for assessing 
whether a twenty-first-century individual may own weaponry for his or her 
defense seems absurd, particularly in light of the transformative impact the 
Fourteenth Amendment has had, and continues to have, on our 
Constitution.  The Founders knew we would arrive at this juncture.138  
They prepared a path in Article V—firmly entrenched within the words of 
the Constitution.139  Article V gave us the Bill of Rights and the imperative 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Let us once again utilize Article V to create a 
workable solution that is not beholden to the “standard model” or the 
historians.  Let us build on the presumption that law-abiding citizens have 
a right to arms and a right to self-defense.  Let us not allow this individual 
right be subject to judicial reconsideration.  Let us create an amendment 
that serves the rights American citizens have fought long and hard to 
secure, without fear of any changes in Supreme Court membership. 
C.  The Text of Any Amendment Must Protect the Right of Law-Abiding 
Individuals to Own and Use Guns 
It has been said that history repeats itself.  So, as we prepare to move 
forward and strengthen our Second Amendment, it is important to consider 
how the Framers approached their task.140  Granted, there will be vital 
distinctions between the path we select today and the paths that opened up 
in the late 1700s.  But, we can learn from the Founders that what we put 
into our new amendment may be every bit as important as what we leave 
out.  A brief, textual analysis of the Second Amendment sheds important 
light on how we should move ourselves forward. 
Our Founders were acutely aware of the need to add a Bill of Rights to 
constrain the federal government from the encroachments on individual 
                                                                                                                          
138 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 135 (“As [the human 
mind] becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, 
and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, 
and keep pace with the times.”). 
139 See Ralph R. Martig, Amending the Constitution, Article Five: The Keystone of the Arch, 35 
MICH. L. REV. 1253, 1253–61 (1937) (discussing the history leading up to the drafting of Article V). 
140 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 652 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 
proper allocation of military power in the new Nation was an issue of central concern for the Framers.  
The compromises they ultimately reached, reflected in Article I’s Militia Clauses and the Second 
Amendment, represent quintessential examples of the Framers’ ‘splitting the atom of sovereignty.’”).   
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states.141  The English experience foretold a need to curtail royal 
prerogative and federal power.  Thus, when the Founders gathered to begin 
drafting our Bill of Rights, their primary goal was to limit federal power, 
not engorge individual freedoms.142  The goal was to improve the Articles 
of Confederation and its weak federal government while simultaneously 
continuing a states’ rights approach that would permit the variances of 
slavery and northern living. 
The Founders were certainly schooled in state constitutional rights, 
rights whose declarations regarding arms were often much more clearly 
written and focused on the broader individual right to protect oneself and 
community.143  The Founders knew the value of states’ rights.  But, in the 
federalism experiment, the Founders believed that perpetuating state 
militias was the surest guard against standing armies.144  As Saul Cornell 
notes, “America’s first great charter of liberty, the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, made no mention of the right to bear arms.  It did, however, assert 
the necessity of a well-regulated militia.”145  In fact, Thomas Jefferson 
initially proposed a broad right to own and use weaponry that was rejected 
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights in favor of George Mason’s militia-
based protection.146  This militia focus embraced a distinctively colonial 
value.147 
In contrast to the Virginia approach, the Pennsylvania Declaration of 
Rights, described as an outlier by one scholar,148 protected quite explicitly 
                                                                                                                          
141 See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 197 (“The Federalists . . . offer[ed] a series of amendments 
that, for the most part, recognized existing limitations on the national government under the new 
Constitution.”). 
142 See Rakove, supra note 70, at 161–62 (“The debate over a bill of rights . . . was about limiting 
the powers of the proposed national government, not trenching further on the traditional police 
responsibilities of the states.”). 
143 See Amar, supra note 33, at 104 (“[S]tate constitutions in 1789 consistently used the phrase 
‘bear arms’ in military contexts and no other.”). 
144 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Second Amendment was adopted to 
protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia.  It was a 
response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to 
disarm the state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the 
sovereignty of the several States.”); see also id. at 651 (“When each word in the text is given full effect, 
the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in 
conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia.”). 
145 Cornell, supra note 99, at 573. 
146 Id. at 574. 
147 See id. at 572 (“Eighteenth-century ideas about the right to bear arms reflected the realities of 
the colonial experience.  The militia provided colonists with a means of protecting themselves from 
external threats and served as a means of preserving public order against the danger of insurrection.”). 
148 See id. at 578 (“The focus on the Pennsylvania Constitution by modern gun rights advocates 
seems ironic given that the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was derided by many within the 
Founding generation, a fact that led Pennsylvanians to cast it aside within a generation of adopting it.”).   
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the “right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”149  
Sometime thereafter, Massachusetts sought to protect a similar right in 
securing the “right to keep and bear arms for the common defense.”150  
But, as noted constitutional scholar Akil Amar reminds, modern observers 
struggle with a clear understanding of eighteenth-century text because 
“[w]hen we turn to state constitutions, we consistently find arms-bearing 
and militia clauses intertwined with rules governing standing armies, 
troop-quartering, martial law, and civilian supremacy.”151  Clearly, the 
Founders world is not our world and our post-Fourteenth Amendment 
Constitution is not their Constitution.   
The Founders did not write on a clean slate, one unaffected by history 
or governing laws.  And neither will we.  The Founders were certainly 
aware of the English militia history beginning with the twelfth-century 
Assize of Arms.152  They were raised on the notion that a militia, rather 
than a standing army, provided the truest guard against the tyranny of the 
State.153  The Founders would have appreciated the distinctions provided 
by the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Pennsylvania Declaration of 
Rights, and the various existing state constitutions.154  The language chosen 
was most assuredly purposeful, drawn from current experience and 
existing documents.  As one scholar notes, “Congress was certainly on 
notice that demands for explicit protections of [individual] rights were on 
the table and could easily have put such language” into the Second 
Amendment.155  The choices made were informed and deliberate, but made 
at a time when individual rights were not as highly valued for all citizens 
as they are today.156  The distinct manner of drafting the right sought to be 
protected existed in Pennsylvania and other states and would have been 
                                                                                                                          
149 Id. at 573.  But, this same Constitution safeguarded the right to hunt in a separate provision 
from the right to “bear arms,” which Cornell suggests merits further analysis regarding the individual 
versus civic right protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution’s “right to bear arms.”  Id. at 581. 
150 Id. at 573. 
151 Amar, supra note 33, at 106. 
152 Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 10. 
153 See id. at 10–11 (detailing the various English struggles between Kings, Parliament, and 
citizens involving tension between the standing armies and militia rule). 
154 Finkelman, supra note 92, at 208–12, 231–32.  The Pennsylvania minority approach is cited by 
many of the “standard model” scholars as proof that the Second Amendment establishes an individual 
right.  While that may have been true within the borders of Pennsylvania, it was most assuredly an 
approach that was actively rejected by the Founders in the ultimate drafting of the Second Amendment.  
See id. at 231–32 (discussing the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 in comparison to the Second 
Amendment). 
155 Id. at 212. 
156 See id. (“The fact that Madison and Congress did not propose amendments along the lines 
demanded by the Pennsylvania minority leads to a prima facie conclusion that they did not intend to 
incorporate such protections into the Bill of Rights.”). 
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well known to those participating in the constitutional process.157   
Madison’s original phrasing presents the strongest possible claim for 
an individual right—limited but at least more akin to our modern 
understanding—to bear arms.  This first draft read: 
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the 
best security of a free country: but no person religiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render 
military service in person.158 
This initial presentation, however, did not survive long.  The House 
Committee responsible for reviewing the amendments made three 
significant changes to Madison’s draft language.159  First, the Committee 
moved the militia language ahead of the right to “keep and bear arms.”160  
Second, the Committee removed the semicolon in the first sentence and, 
instead, inserted a comma.161  Third, the House Committee further 
elaborated what was meant by a well-regulated militia, referring to “the 
body of the people.”162  It bears emphasizing that the eighteenth-century 
understanding of “the people” never meant all the people in its literal 
sense.  In our pre-Fourteenth Amendment society, “the body of the people” 
referred solely to portions of the white male population. 163   
                                                                                                                          
157 See id. at 209 (highlighting the comprehensive language used in the Antifederalists’ Reasons 
of Dissent, which “underscore[ed] the connection many Antifederalists saw between state sovereignty 
and the control of the state militia”). 
158 Rakove, supra note 70, at 120 (quoting THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, 
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 169 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
159 Id. at 121–22. 
160 Id. 
161 Id.  While it is nearly impossible to appreciate what the House Committee intended by 
removing the semicolon and replacing it with a comma, Professor Rakove presents the most probable 
explanation of transposing the first two “rights” and then connecting these with a comma rather than 
semicolon:  
[I]f the semicolon in Madison’s original resolution could be read as stating two 
distinct rights, not one, its replacement by a comma would seem to connect the two 
members of the Amendment more closely; that is, it would link the preamble and the 
right more intimately than had been the case before, and thereby tie the right of arms 
bearing to the institution of the militia. 
Id. at 126. 
162 Id. at 122. 
163 Id. at 108.  Rakove provides a very critical observation regarding originalist constitutional 
interpretation, namely, that the proper originalist approach toward the militia requires acceptance that: 
[T]he concept of the militia had a fixed and consensually accepted meaning in 
ordinary usage, so that it was essentially coterminous with the free adult male 
population physically capable of bearing arms; and if the language of the 
Constitution is not to be rendered completely plastic, modern interpretation has to 
preserve that meaning. 
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Thus, when the official Second Amendment text was proffered in the 
House, it read as follows: “A well regulated militia, composed of the body 
of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously 
scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.”164 
This original phrasing contains a clear emphasis on the duty, during 
the eighteenth century, of “the body of the people” to supply the first line 
of communal defense.165  The goal was to diffuse the Antifederalists fears 
regarding the continuing viability of militias.166  At the same time, 
Madison wanted to ensure that those harboring religious objections to 
participating in militia duty would be protected against compelled service.  
This improved version, however, would not survive in the Senate.  Instead, 
the Senate ultimately settled on the Amendment’s current language: “A 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”167 
“Perhaps no provision in the Constitution causes one to stumble quite 
so much on a first reading, or second, or third reading, as the short 
provision in the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights.”168  What 
remains clear, however—to the extent any clarity can be obtained from 
eighteenth-century writings—is that the Founders were surely aware that 
they had numerous options from which to choose when drafting the 
Second Amendment.169  The Latin phrase, expressio unius est exclusion 
alterius should be conceded in measuring the final version of our Second 
Amendment.170  The Founders knew that certain existing state constitutions 
                                                                                                                          
Id. 
164 Finkelman, supra note 92, at 226 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 
1834)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
165 See Merkel, supra note 35, at 688 (“[The eighteenth-century] right to arms was thus not only 
more civic than privatistic, it also happily existed alongside a wide array of regulations and restrictions 
pertaining to arms possession and use.”). 
166 See id. at 680–81 (“Many of the founders, and more of the Anti-Federalists, who agitated for a 
Bill of Rights, preferred that the nation place its first reliance on local citizen militia rather than 
professional soldiery.” (footnote omitted)). 
167 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
168 William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 
1236, 1236 (1994). 
169 See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 207–12 (describing the content of the Antifederalist’s 
“proposed amendments concerning the army, the militia, the right to bear arms, and the right to hunt,” 
which were ultimately excluded from the Second Amendment).  In particular, Professor Finkelman 
notes that the Pennsylvania delegation, often highlighted by the “standard model” scholars, proposed 
three amendments to the Constitution solely relating to gun ownership and military matters.  Id. at 207.  
Clearly included in these three “gun rights” proposals were amendments to secure “the right of self-
protection through the ownership of weapons . . . [and] the right to hunt and fish.”  Id.  Only those 
proffered amendments speaking to the militia were ultimately enveloped in the Bill of Rights. 
170 Chief Justice Marshall embraced this same concept in Marbury v. Madison when he reminded:  
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contained clauses guaranteeing an individually focused right of self-
defense.171  The Founders knew that existing state constitutions tethered 
the right to keep or bears arms to both individual and communal defense, 
something uniquely experienced in eighteenth-century America, but 
declined to embrace a broader individual rights model.172  This is not to 
suggest that such individual right cannot be found, modernly, in the 
Second Amendment.  Such individual right – though currently limited to 
permitting a handgun for the protection of one’s self in the home – has 
indeed been found.  This history is provided to underscore that our modern 
“rights-based” Constitution is a vastly different Constitution from the one 
ratified in 1788.   
Textually, it is impossible to ignore the militia focus of the Second 
Amendment.173  “The draft language suggests that the framers saw this 
essentially as an amendment connected to the militia; any right to own 
weapons was a collective right, derived from the right of each state to 
maintain a ‘well regulated militia.’”174  As Akhil Amar observes: 
[P]rotection against thugs and pirates was not the main image 
of the Second Amendment at the Founding.  The amendment 
was about Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill.  When arms 
were outlawed, only the king’s men would have arms.  The 
amendments forged in the afterglow of the Revolution 
reflected obvious anxiety about a standing army controlled 
by the new imperial government, and affection for the good 
                                                                                                                          
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those 
affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or 
they have no operation at all.  It cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is 
inadmissible, unless the words require it. 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
171 Professor Finkelman quotes two of the proposed Pennsylvania Amendments.  Number Seven 
called for broad gun ownership “for the defense of themselves and their own state . . . or for the 
purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for 
crimes committed,” and Number Eight sought to protect the “liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable 
times.”  Finkelman, supra note 92, at 208.  Both recommendations were plainly discarded in the 
drafting of the Second Amendment, which omits any clearly stated individual right to own a weapon or 
protect the right to hunt or fowl.     
172 See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 231 (“The fact that Madison refused to adopt such [individual 
rights-based] language—and that Congress did not amend the proposal to add such language—suggests 
that the Federalists who were in control of Congress in 1789 did not intend to create an individual 
right.”). 
173 See id. at 208 (“By seeing what the framers of the Second Amendment did not do, we can 
better understand what they did do.”).  In interpreting the Second Amendment, Professor Finkelman 
advocates a very logical approach: “[I]t is useful to consider what Congress might have written, but did 
not.”  Id. 
174 Id. at 226. 
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old militia.175 
However, the “legal and social structure upon which the [Second 
Amendment] is built no longer exists.”176  Whatever relevance the militia 
may have held two centuries ago has vanished just as quickly as the 
musket and flintlock.  Modern Americans struggle to appreciate the 
transposition of a standing army and militia as we depend upon, and 
embrace, our modern military to an extent that would, and in fact did, 
alarm the Founders.177  Our patriotism was their heresy.   
Thus, we are faced with the dilemma of clinging to an Amendment that 
evokes controversy without adequately protecting the individual rights 
springing forth from our Constitution.  The Founders’ Second Amendment 
is vastly distinct from our Second Amendment.  The eighteenth-century 
militia is a historic relic.  Such world-view has been extinguished by 
massive standing armies, nuclear and chemical weaponry, and 
technological advances that permit a soldier sitting in the United States or 
elsewhere to send a drone thousands of miles away without ever herself 
facing physical danger.178  While the fear of tyranny still exists, the fear of 
a standing army—particularly our great military—does not.   
We have become so removed in time and experience from the 
Founding generation that it seems naïve to continue to rely upon their 
defense model.  We have professional police forces.  We have an extensive 
standing army, perhaps the greatest military in the world.  We have laws 
that permit individuals to stand their ground and carry concealed weapons.   
We recognize a right of self-defense regardless of race, gender, or national 
origin.179  In short, our world has radically transformed from  the world 
encountered by our Founders.  Why, then, should our Second Amendment 
as currently constructed continue to endure, weathering what will surely 
become constitutional storm after storm?  Why risk the rights of lawful gun 
owners to own and use their weapons?  Why not use the tools that were left 
for us when facing such a situation—a change in times and focus?  Why 
not return power to the state legislatures where individuals, through local 
                                                                                                                          
175 Amar, supra note 33, at 109. 
176 Id. at 106. 
177 See id. at 108 (“At the Founding, a standing army in peacetime was viewed with dread and 
seen as Others—mercenaries, convicts, vagrants, aliens—rather than ordinary citizens.  Today, we view 
our professional armed forces with pride.”). 
178 See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 209 (“We might argue today about what sort of weapons are 
protected [by the Second Amendment].  It is not clear that such provisions would today protect the 
private ownership of Saturday night specials, assault rifles (however Congress might define them), 
submachine guns, sawed-off shotguns, bazookas, or flamethrowers.  But, whatever fell in or out of the 
protected arena, the constitutional principle of private ownership of weapons would have been clear.  
Had Congress added these provisions to the Bill of Rights, we would also have a very different country 
than we have today, assuming, of course, that we still would have a country.”). 
179 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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democracy, have a voice in the interpretation, and creation, of gun 
regulations?  Why not Article V?   
IV.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT COMES OF AGE 
“Scarcely any political question arises in the United States . . . that is 
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”180  In 2008, the U.S. 
Supreme Court broke its nearly seventy-year silence regarding the Second 
Amendment.181  Not since the 1930s, when the Court had limited the 
Second Amendment to communal militia service, had the Court 
reconsidered its unaltered interpretation.182  And, with few notable 
exceptions, courts reviewing the right to keep and bear arms ruled that the 
Founders intended a constrained right to arms generally, if not exclusively, 
attached to militia service.  It was inconsequential whether the question 
involved weaponry (only weaponry connected to militia service was 
protected)183 or activity (only activity relating to militia service was 
protected);184 courts universally gave a very limited view of the Framers’ 
intentions.  There was a clear and consistent pattern: the right to keep and 
bear arms was not a free-standing individual right but unequivocally 
conjoined with militia service.185   
The winds of change began to blow when Justice Thomas authored a 
concurring opinion in Printz v. United States.186  Printz addressed the 
constitutionality, under the Tenth Amendment, of the Brady Act, a federal 
gun law that required local law enforcement to perform background checks 
on gun purchasers during the interim period before the national instant 
                                                                                                                          
180 Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385, 385 (1969) 
(quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
181 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
182 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“The Constitution as originally adopted 
granted to the Congress power . . . ‘[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . 
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)). 
183 See id. (“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun 
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to 
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.  Certainly it is not within judicial notice that 
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the 
common defense.” (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840))).   
184 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (“It is undoubtedly true that all citizens 
capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as 
well as of the States . . . .”). 
185 See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render 
possible the effectiveness of such [militia] forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second 
Amendment were made.  It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”). 
186 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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background check became operational.187  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, found the law violated federalism principles by improperly 
commandeering local law enforcement to administer a federal program.188  
The Second Amendment was neither argued nor litigated, but it 
nonetheless came of age in this opinion.189  Justice Thomas’s dicta proved 
a harbinger of things to come: 
Even if we construe Congress’ authority to regulate interstate 
commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce, I question 
whether Congress can regulate the particular [gun purchase] 
transactions at issue here.  The Constitution, in addition to 
delegating certain enumerated powers to Congress, places 
whole areas outside the reach of Congress’ regulatory 
authority. . . . The Second Amendment similarly appears to 
contain an express limitation on the Government’s authority.  
That Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”  This 
Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of 
the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment.  
If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a 
personal right to “keep and bear arms,” a colorable argument 
exists that the Federal Government’s regulatory scheme, at 
least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession 
of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment’s 
protections. . . . Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will 
have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was 
correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms “has justly 
been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a 
republic.”190   
Prior to Justice Thomas’s concurrence, the only changes between the 
Court’s 1939 opinion in United States v. Miller191 and 2008 appeared to be 
an increased scholarly push toward adopting the individual rights model192 
                                                                                                                          
187 Id. at 902. 
188 See id. at 933 (“‘The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.’  The [Brady Act’s] mandatory obligation imposed on [state law 
enforcement officers] to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs 
afoul of that rule.” (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992))). 
189 See id. at 938–39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As the parties did not raise this [Second 
Amendment] argument . . . we need not consider it here.”). 
190 Id. at 937–39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
191 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
192 See Ehrman & Henigen, supra note 50, at 6 (“The argument that the constitution is a barrier to 
stronger gun laws has received support in recent years from articles appearing in various legal 
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and a conservative shift in the Court’s membership.193  In fact, in 1983, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case nearly identical to McDonald v. 
Chicago.194  At that time, not a single Justice felt the need to revisit Miller 
or overturn the Seventh Circuit’s holding that “[b]ecause the second 
amendment is not applicable to [the states] and because possession of 
handguns by individuals is not part of the right to keep and bear arms, [the 
Morton Grove Ordinance did] not violate the second amendment.”195  
Instead, the Supreme Court in a single sentence denied review.196  Miller 
was still the law of the land. 
Between 1983 and 1997, when Printz was decided, the Supreme 
Court’s composition changed dramatically.  Six new Justices would join 
the Court.  The first change was the appointment of Associate Justice 
Antonin Scalia.197  The next appointment was Associate Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, who, like Justice Scalia, was appointed by Republican President 
Ronald Reagan.198  The next two Justices, appointed by Republican 
President George Herbert Walker Bush, were Associate Justices David 
Souter and Clarence Thomas, respectively.199  Finally, Democratic 
President William Jefferson Clinton appointed two new members to the 
Court, Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.200 
The appointment of these six new Justices changed two-thirds of the 
Court’s membership.  Thus, it is not surprising that this new combination 
would prompt significant constitutional changes.  The most noteworthy 
                                                                                                                          
publications which conclude that the second amendment guarantees a broad, individual right to own 
firearms for lawful private purposes in the same way that the first amendment guarantees individual 
rights of free speech, religion, and assembly.”).  Ehrman and Henigen’s article even predates the 
plethora of recent scholarship, including that which is self-described as the “standard model” mantra. 
193 See Merkel, supra note 35, at 697 (predicting, in 2006, that the appointment of Justices 
Roberts and Alito would “make it more likely, perhaps all but certain, that a definitive Supreme Court 
opinion guaranteeing a private right to arms under the Second Amendment [would] issue within a few 
years”).  With the Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald, Merkel’s prescient forecast came true 
both in time and substance.  Former Chief Justice Rehnquist warned against such a “living 
Constitution” approach, reminding that the nature of the Constitution “was designed to enable the 
popularly elected branches of government, not the judicial branch, to keep the country abreast of the 
times.”  Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 699 (emphasis added).  Perhaps Justice Rehnquist’s reluctance to 
modernize gun rights explains why the Roberts Court, rather than the Rehnquist Court, first took up the 
issue.   
194 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). 
195 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). 
196 Quilici, 464 U.S. 863. 
197 Justice Scalia took his judicial oath of office on September 26, 1986.  Biographies of Current 
Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.asp
x (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).   
198 Justice Kennedy took his judicial oath of office on February 18, 1988.  Id.   
199 Justice Souter took his judicial oath of office on October 9, 1990.  Justice Thomas took his 
judicial oath of office on October 23, 1991.  Id.   
200 Justice Ginsburg took her judicial oath of office on August 10, 1993.  Justice Breyer took his 
judicial oath of office on August 3, 1994.  Id.   
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change, in relation to the Second Amendment, was Justice Thomas’s 
revitalization of the previously discarded individual rights view.201  Justice 
Thomas captured much of the burgeoning “standard model” scholarship in 
his Printz footnote: “Marshaling an impressive array of historical evidence, 
a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the ‘right to keep 
and bear arms’ is, as the Amendment’s text suggests, a personal right.”202  
Justice Thomas, deliberately or not, galvanized the Second Amendment’s 
rebirth. 
A mere twelve years later, Justice Thomas and the “standard model” 
would prevail in a much more meaningful decision.  In 2008, the Supreme 
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller veered far from an originalist 
approach and nearly two centuries of jurisprudence in finding the Second 
Amendment’s “central” protection was the individual right to maintain a 
handgun in the home for personal self-defense purposes.203  This holding is 
remarkable when one considers the nearly uninterrupted history of courts, 
both state and federal, finding that the “central” focus of the Second 
Amendment was militia service and militia weaponry.204  Handguns would 
have been unknown to the Founders whose world was dominated—at least 
from the modern perspective—by antiquated weaponry that was large and 
clumsy and required gunpowder and musket balls for operation.205  And, to 
aid in “self-defense,” colonial America preferred disarmament and 
proscriptions against weaponry as opposed to arming the entire 
populace.206  
Cases prior to Heller routinely considered the Second Amendment 
limited, at its core, to military weaponry connected to militia service.207  
Self-defense was never considered by eighteenth-, nineteenth-, or 
twentieth-century courts to be a motivating feature, or core purpose of the 
Second Amendment.208  Thus, Justice Scalia’s rejection of originalism is 
                                                                                                                          
201 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937–39 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
202 Id. at 938 n.2. 
203  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
204 See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (2000) (“If there is such a thing as settled constitutional law, the Second 
Amendment may have been its quintessential example.”); see also Farber, supra note 46, at 180 
(“Justice Scalia has also stressed stare decisis as a limit on originalism.  Despite originalism’s centrality 
in his thinking about judicial review, it plays little role in some of Justice Scalia’s most notable 
opinions.”).  
205 See Clayton Cramer, Colonial Firearms Regulation, 16 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16 
(2004) (discussing colonists’ use of muskets in early frontier battles). 
206 See supra note Part II.   
207 The one major, and modern, exception was United States v. Emerson, which held that the 
Second Amendment “protects the right of individuals to privately keep and bear their own firearms that 
are suitable as individual, personal weapons.”  270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001). 
208 But see Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): 
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self–Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 623, 
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notable,209 particularly in light of his own writing that the only true voice to 
constitutional interpretation is originalism.210  Equally troubling is the 
Court’s slim majority opinion that casts a clear deviation from past 
jurisprudence.211  What the majority follows is not precedent, but rather, 
                                                                                                                          
641–43 (2012) (discussing different state court treatments of Second Amendment rights in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries).  Professor Merkel expresses frustration: 
[T]hose who call themselves originalist (or even textualists), those who base the 
legitimacy of the interpretation they offer on its alleged fidelity to a past 
understanding, place themselves under an obligation to advance an account of that 
past understanding that is not demonstrably counter-factual, naïve, or absurd, and 
that this holds whether one’s perspective is essentially elitist (framer-focused) or 
popular (We the People-focused). 
Merkel, supra note 35, at 686. 
209 See Honorable Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way, Remarks 
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005), available                                
at http://cfif.org/htdocs/legal_issues/legal_updates/us_supreme_cour/scalia-constitutional-speech.htm 
(discussing his rejection of the label “strict constructionist”).  In his comments, Justice Scalia explains 
what “originalism” means: 
I am one of a small number of judges, small number of anybody—judges, 
professors, lawyers—who are known as originalists.  Our manner of interpreting the 
Constitution is to begin with the text, and to give that text the meaning that it bore 
when it was adopted by the people. 
Id.  Scalia was quite direct in explaining how non-originalist judges previously explained their 
deviation from originalism: “[P]rior to the advent of the ‘Living Constitution,’ judges did their 
distortions the good old fashioned way, the honest way—they lied about it.  They said the Constitution 
means such and such, when it never meant such and such.”  Id.  These comments appear rather ironic 
following the Court’s holding in Heller, which most historians (the individuals Justice Scalia usually 
informs us are best suited to aid in interpretations) reject on historical grounds.  See Saul Cornell, 
Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1112–13 (2009) (rejecting the claim that historical evidence shows that the 
forefathers supported an individual rights component to the Second Amendment). 
210 See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 90 (discussing Scalia’s embrace of a living Constitution in 
Heller). 
211 Every federal circuit, except the Second and Fifth Circuits, had found that the Second 
Amendment protected a collective right for individuals relating to militia service.  See United States v. 
Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Miller Court assigned no special importance to the 
character of the weapon itself, but instead demanded a reasonable relationship between its ‘possession 
or use’ and militia-related activity.” (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939))); Love 
v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he lower federal courts have uniformly held that 
the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right.”); United States v. Warin, 
530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (“It is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective 
rather than an individual right.”); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (“[U]nder 
the Second Amendment, the federal government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single 
individual as well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or use of any 
weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia.”); accord United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting, like 
previous 10th Circuit panels, the “time worn” challenge to felon in possession statutes because no 
federal criminal gun-control could be said to violate the Second Amendment unless it “impair[s] the 
state’s ability to maintain a well-regulated militia”); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (“Recent scholarship, however, does not provide a sufficient basis for overruling an earlier 
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the burgeoning scholarship calling for an individual right to “keep and bear 
arms.”  This type of analysis, embracing the “living Constitution,” is 
precisely the analytical framework that the Heller five-member majority 
would usually reject and ridicule.212  But, in fairness, the dissent embraces 
an anti-individual rights approach that is unfamiliar to their usual 
jurisprudence.  Heller clearly demonstrates the mischief that can occur 
when nine unelected Justices are permitted to define, or delimit, the 
individual rights emanating from the penumbras of the Constitution. 
A similar dilemma is posed by the Court’s 2010 plurality decision in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago.213  For the first time, the Court found the 
Second Amendment was intended to be fully incorporated to apply to the 
individual states.214  While four members of the Court found the right 
incorporated under Due Process,215 Justice Thomas would have expanded 
application of the right through the Privileges and Immunities Clause.216  
                                                                                                                          
decision of this Court.”); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“Whatever questions remain unanswered, Miller and its progeny do confirm that the Second 
Amendment establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from the role possession of the gun might 
play in maintaining a state militia.”); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“[I]n order to claim Second Amendment protection, Wright must demonstrate a reasonable 
relationship between his possession of the machineguns and pipe bombs and ‘the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated militia.’” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 
98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We follow our sister circuits in holding that the Second Amendment is a right 
held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen.”); United States 
v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Considering this history, we cannot conclude that the 
Second Amendment protects the individual possession of military weapons . . . .  The rule emerging 
from Miller is that, absent a showing that the possession of a certain weapon has ‘some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,’ the Second Amendment does 
not guarantee the right to possess the weapon.” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)); United States v. 
Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (“Defendant presents a long historical analysis of the 
amendment’s background and purpose from which he concludes that every citizen has the absolute 
right to keep arms.  This broad conclusion has long been rejected.” (citing Miller, 307 U.S. 174)). 
212 See Laurence H. Tribe, Approaches to Constitutional Analysis, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y 
FOR LAW & POLICY, IT IS A CONSTITUTION WE ARE EXPOUNDING: COLLECTED WRITINGS ON 
INTERPRETING OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENT 26 (2009) (discussing the importance of starting with the 
Constitution’s “original meaning”).  Professor Tribe explains “[o]riginal meaning as [a] starting point”: 
Regardless of how committed one might be to the notion of the Constitution as fluid 
and evolving, it seems clear that interpretation of its provisions—or, indeed, of its 
design—must at least begin with the question of what those provisions, or that 
design, meant at the time when they were conceived and, later, at the time they 
became law.  Absent some extremely persuasive justification, it would be 
nonsensical to begin by treating a phrase in the Constitution as meaning one thing 
when, to those who wrote or ratified or read it at the time, it would have meant 
something entirely different.   
Id. 
213 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
214 Id. at 3026.   
215 Id. at 3030–31. 
216 Id. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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Even casual observers of the Court would recognize McDonald as an 
extremely fractured opinion, with five individual Justices writing opinions 
amassing 111 total pages.217  Such opinions, regardless of topic, underscore 
the reality that many of our individual rights are tenuously held, or upheld, 
by slim majorities on the Supreme Court.  Rather than strengthen Heller 
and a law-abiding individual’s right to possess firearms McDonald may 
simply have exposed the fragile nature of existing Second Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
 Much like Heller, the McDonald decision breaks new ground that may 
be due as much to Court composition as judicial doctrine.218  The Supreme 
Court had past opportunities to incorporate the Second Amendment but did 
not.  The most notable of these occasions occurred in 1983 when the Court 
refused to reconsider Miller,219 Presser v. Illinois,220 and United States v. 
Cruikshank221 in the Seventh Circuit decision, Quilici v. Village of Morton 
Grove.222  Many of these past opinions, excepting Quilici, would have been 
much closer and contemporaneous to the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than the twenty-first-century cases handed down by a 
conservative Court.223  Yet, there is little doubt that a post-Fourteenth 
Amendment Constitution values individual rights where such rights are 
integral to liberty and freedom.224  The starting point for evaluating 
individual rights begins with history.225  But, the key inquiry is whether a 
                                                                                                                          
217 Id. at 3026 (plurality opinion).  The five opinions span 111 pages in the Supreme Court 
Reporter, which will likely yield even greater density in the forthcoming U.S. Reports.  Justice Alito 
wrote a twenty-five page opinion for the plurality.  Justices Scalia (nine pages) and Thomas (thirty-one 
pages) both authored concurring opinions.  And, following their dissents in Heller, both Justice Stevens 
(thirty-three pages) and Justice Breyer (seventeen pages) drafted dissenting opinions in McDonald. 
218 Writing for the plurality, Justice Alito explains: “[i]n sum, it is clear that the Framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”  Id. at 3042.  Thus, following 
McDonald, individuals are given a substantive due process right to possess weaponry for self-defense 
purposes subject to the still undefined instances where the right does not exist for everyone.  
219 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
220 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
221 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
222 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 
(1983). 
223 See, e.g., Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“The Supreme Court . . . has held that the Second Amendment constrains only the actions of 
Congress, not the states.”); Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark. 353, 356 (1882) (interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s application narrowly to the freed slave population and similarly finding no violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause); Strickland v. State, 72 S.E. 260, 263 
(Ga. 1911) (reminding that the Supreme Court had found—very near in time to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification—that the Second Amendment “was a restriction upon the power of Congress 
only”). 
224 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (reminding the Due Process Clause 
“provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty Interests”). 
225 Id. at 710. 
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particular right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that 
“neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”226  
While history is on the side of case law preceding Heller and 
McDonald, a modern individual-rights focused Constitutional paradigm 
has been building since the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.227  Ironically, the opponents of an individual right to bear 
arms for purposes of self-defense and handgun possession usually align 
themselves with the more liberal approach to constitutional interpretation 
and celebrate such individual rights as abortion, same-sex intimacy, and an 
expansive right to privacy.228  Yet, in what has become somewhat common 
for the Court, Justices (and scholars) transpose their usual alliances for a 
more historically-grounded and legally-narrow interpretive philosophy 
when the result is politically desirable.229  When it comes to guns, 
traditional liberal interpretations were jettisoned by the dissenting Justices 
in the name of historical fidelity.230  Such juxtaposition of usual 
Constitutional interpretation gives this author pause.  How can lawful gun 
owners be certain that a majority of Justice will side with them on larger 
issues, such as open-carry laws or background checks?   
Heller and McDonald give ample reason to remove the Justices from 
                                                                                                                          
226 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937). 
227 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(first espousing a Constitutional “right” of 
privacy). 
228 See Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that some judges are able to find individual rights in other amendments but fail to find such 
rights within the Second Amendment).  The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear Silveira en banc, 
and the denial contained four dissenting opinions.  Id. at 568.  Judge Kozinski’s opinion, much like 
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Printz, provided much needed traction for the “individual 
rights” movement.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938–39 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(discussing that, up until that point, the Court had not been presented with the “opportunity to 
determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms ‘has justly been 
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic’”).  Judge Kozinski criticized the irony in his 
liberal colleagues pushing for a narrow view of the Second Amendment by observing that “[j]udges 
know very well how to read the Constitution broadly when they are sympathetic to the right being 
asserted.”  Silveira, 328 F.3d at 568 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  He continued, “But, as the panel 
[below] aptly demonstrates, when we’re none too keen on a particular constitutional guarantee, we can 
be equally ingenious in burying language that is incontrovertibly there.”  Id. 
229 See Silveira, 328 F.3d at 569 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (providing a historical synopsis of 
disarmament).  Judge Kozinski elaborated:  
The able judges of the panel majority are usually very sympathetic to individual 
rights, but they have succumbed to the temptation to pick and choose.  Had they 
brought the same generous approach to the Second Amendment that they routinely 
bring to the First, Fourth and selected potions of the Fifth, they would have had no 
trouble finding an individual right to bear arms. 
Id. 
230 See Levinson, supra note 17, at 643, 645–50 (applying Philip Bobbitt’s historical modality of 
constitutional interpretation analysis to the Second Amendment). 
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the gun-rights equation.231  Following these decisions we are left with no 
clear constitutional standard of review, no clear explication of the Second 
Amendment’s parameters, and no clear juridical basis for the Court’s 
respective holdings.  Heller tells us that despite the clarity of language and 
purpose in the prefatory clause, the “well regulated militia” was never 
intended to be the “central” purpose of the Second Amendment.232  
McDonald informs us that despite Presser and Cruikshank’s proximity to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the modern incorporation doctrine demands 
the Second Amendment be applied to the states as a fundamental right.233 
Perhaps the rights of the people, with both “rights” and “people” being 
now far more broadly construed than during the colonial period, should be 
reconsidered.  Our constitutional approach to rights, whether they be gun 
rights or abortion rights, are too far removed from the Founders’ world to 
credibly interpret either their original intent or textual objectives.  And, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, completely unknown to the Founders, has 
transformed our entire Constitutional democracy.  The time has come for a 
new approach, one that the Founders provided to allow for a living 
                                                                                                                          
231 See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary 
Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 247 (2012) (remarking, two years after McDonald and only four 
years after Heller, that the Second Amendment “is now part of ‘normal constitutional law,’ which is to 
say that discussion about its meaning has moved from the question of whether it means anything at all, 
to a well-established position that it protects an individual right, and is enforceable as such against both 
states and the federal government” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).  It is remarkable that less than 
five years after the Court completely changed course on an extremely settled Second Amendment 
interpretation, an esteemed constitutional law scholar would suggest that this nascent right established 
by a slim 5–4 majority is now somehow “well-established.”  This author would argue that not only is 
the right not well-established, it is equally not well-supported in history or law. 
232 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).  However, as articulated in Heller:  
It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause 
announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of 
the militia.  The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the 
only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even 
more important for self-defense and hunting.  But the threat that the new Federal 
Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the 
reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written 
Constitution.  Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense is merely a 
“subsidiary interest” of the right to keep and bear arms is profoundly mistaken.  He 
bases that assertion solely upon the prologue—but that can only show that self-
defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central component of 
the right itself. 
Id at 599. 
233 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (“In Heller, we held that the 
Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.  
Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects 
a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government 
and the States.  We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.” (citation omitted)).  
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Constitution: the Article V Amendment process.234  The time has come for 
us to amend the Second Amendment to ensure that lawful gun owners do 
not see their rights proscribed, or constricted, by a slim majority of 
Supreme Court Justices. 
V.  THE TIME HAS COME TO REPLACE 27 WITH 28 
“The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning 
of a law [is to inquire into] the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which 
moved the legislator to enact it.  For when this reason ceases, the law itself 
ought likewise to cease with it.”235  Much like Jonathon Swift before me, 
though lacking his literary grace, I feel compelled to put forth a modest 
proposal to amend the Second Amendment so as to strengthen its 
presumed protections.236  Before opposing this novel approach, I would 
suggest that perhaps the proposal is neither as desperate nor as aspirational 
as it seems.  Article V permits the best solution for our Second 
Amendment dilemma—a dilemma that is crippling our legislators, 
clogging our courts, hamstringing our cities, and making it increasingly 
difficult for lawful gun owners to securely assert their individual rights.  
Article V permits us to amend the Second Amendment to replace it with 
something much more applicable to our modern times.  Rather than stray 
willfully, or ignorantly, from the Founders’ Second Amendment, it is time 
to stand up and call for real change, real substance, and meaningful action.  
It is time to replace the Second Amendment’s twenty-seven words with a 
new and improved Twenty-Eighth Amendment that focuses on the right of 
law-abiding citizens to retain their guns free from unnecessary 
governmental intrusion or interference. 
I hereby propose that the Second Amendment be amended  in the 
following manner: 
PROPOSAL:  Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution 
Sec. 1: The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States is hereby replaced immediately with this new 
                                                                                                                          
234 See supra note 5 (discussing the Article V amendment process). 
235 Cornell, supra note 99, at 576 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 60 (George Sharswood ed., 1895)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
236 See generally JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL (1729) (proposing a solution “for 
preventing the children of poor people in Ireland[] from being a burden to their parents or county, and 
for making them beneficial to the publick” by selling a large portion of its children to be consumed as 
food). 
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Amendment.237 
Sec.  2: Congress shall make no law regulating or otherwise 
restricting the use, ownership or transfer of guns and 
weaponry.238  Congress retains, however, the sole power to 
regulate and restrict all weaponry intended for military use, 
including tanks, drones, bombs, and fully automatic guns and 
weaponry.239  No such restriction or regulation may be made 
on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religious 
heritage.240 
Sec. 3: Existing federal gun control laws regulating felons 
in possession or persons under indictment for domestic 
violence are not affected by this Amendment.  Such existing 
laws remain valid, but no new regulations may be initiated at 
the federal level except as provided in Section 2 of this 
Amendment. 
Sec. 4: Each State has the power to regulate or restrict the 
use, ownership, and transfer of all non-military style 
weaponry, including all semi-automatic guns, within its 
borders.241  No such restriction or regulation may be made on 
                                                                                                                          
237 This is the same formula used in the Twenty-First Amendment when the Eighteenth 
Amendment was repealed and replaced.  I would recommend following the same, though admittedly 
remarkable, precedent.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
238 This Congressional exemption relating to weaponry is similar to the Commerce Clause 
exemption granted to the states for alcohol regulation, an Article otherwise subject to interstate 
commerce regulation, under the Twenty-First Amendment.  See id. § 2. 
239 This provision ensures that only the federal government would have the power or authority to 
possess certain military weapons that were never intended to be in private hands.  In some measure, this 
provision comports with existing Second Amendment case law—at least case law relating to the 
Founders’ Second Amendment—that military weaponry can be removed from pure individual pursuits 
and remain connected to the civic role of military/militia service.  See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 
1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Second Amendment is a “collective right” for states to 
maintain a militia and not a “protection for the individual’s right to bear arms”); Silveira v. Lockyer, 
312 F.3d 1052, 1087 (2002), abrogated by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that California could regulate or prohibit assault weapons).  The provision may prove 
controversial, however, as this section places solely in Congress’s jurisdiction the power to regulate, or 
even proscribe, military-style high capacity guns.  
240 This provision, coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment, should prevent any return to the 
Black Codes or days when Native Americans were denied access to guns in order to further the then 
existing white social order.  See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 323–27 (discussing the colonial 
American history of white settlers arming themselves to maintain control over slaves and to protect 
against attacks from Native Americans). 
241 This approach merely returns us to the period prior to McDonald, when individual states were 
permitted to regulate, and even restrict, certain weaponry.  Admittedly, this provision is far broader 
than the post-Heller and McDonald opinions, as this provision would permit a complete ban on non-
military weaponry, even for self-defense purposes.  This section allows each state to determine for 
itself what rights and regulations, if any, should exist in relation to weaponry. 
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the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religious heritage.242   
Sec. 5: This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have 
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by 
conventions in the several States, as provided in the 
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the 
submission hereof to the States by Congress.243 
Many who read this proposal will respond viscerally contending that 
such option is outrageous or unnecessary.  Such reflexive reaction is short-
sighted and fails to appreciate the dangers of continuing to rely upon an 
unelected Supreme Court for periodic direction on gun rights.  Those who 
claim an individual “right” in the constitutional sense to keep and use a 
gun for hunting, self-defense, or other purposes, will not likely want to 
evaluate a new approach to gun rights.  Why should they?  The current 
Supreme Court appears likely to continue giving some, still unclear, 
protection to gun owners and gun rights.  But, the Court’s composition is 
bound to change, and soon.  The problem with relying on the fluid 
dynamics of the Supreme Court is that today’s majority can quickly 
become tomorrow’s dissent.  The Court’s balance of ideological power 
appears split 5 to 4.  This is a fragile and vulnerable majority.  Thus, any 
change in membership could return our country to the Second 
Amendment’s previous interpretation consistently advanced until Heller 
and McDonald. The age of several of the Justices suggests retirements 
could be eminent.   
The Founders recognized that in order for their Constitution to survive 
generations, an adaptive, modernizing tool was necessary.  Article V, the 
Amendment process, was provided to deal with changing conditions like 
those facing the Second Amendment.  No longer is the focus a militia that 
needs to be poised to protect us.  No longer do we fear a standing army as 
the threat to our liberty and security, but rather, we celebrate the world’s 
greatest military and its ability to protect our many freedoms.  While many 
still understandably fear tyranny or the threat that government tyranny 
could compromise our liberties, another threat is the uncertain precedent 
regarding guns.  Regulations will continue to plague lawful gun owners.  
And, calls for limits to the number of concealed carry licenses, open carry 
                                                                                                                          
242 This provision, which is identical to that provided in Section 2 of this proposed amendment, 
see supra text accompanying note 240, ensures that there shall be no return to the Black Codes or days 
where Native Americans were denied access to guns in order to further the then existing white social 
order.  See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
243 This is the identical language pulled from the Twenty-First Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXI, § 3.  While this author does not prefer one method of ratification over another as provided by 
Article V, the language selected for this proposal comes directly from the only other Amendment that 
both repealed and replaced another Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. art. V (discussing the two methods 
of ratifying an amendment). 
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opposition, background checks and other restrictive laws will continue to 
proliferate.  Our Second Amendment rights are currently in the hands of a 
very divided Supreme Court.    
The Second Amendment, as currently written, no longer provides 
adequate protection to lawful gun owners.  Rather than completely 
abandon our Constitution, we have the ability to restructure these 
protections in a manner more likely to protect our modern lives and our 
law-abiding citizens.  Or we can continue to rely on the Supreme Court and 
its vacillating membership to expound and modernize the Constitution, 
always hoping that the Justices sharing our ideological viewpoint remain in 
the majority.  Heller and McDonald are literally a single judicial 
appointment away from reversal.      
The more predictable approach, Article V’s constitutional amendment 
process, is also the more difficult path.  The Founders wanted the 
Constitution to be difficult to alter and, thus, ensured that any amendment 
would need to receive massive legislative and state support.244  That is not 
to say that this solution is impossible or ill-conceived.  This author 
wholeheartedly believes that the time has come to modernize protection for 
our gun rights, both collectively and individually, in a meaningful manner.  
Let us return the “right” to the states to implement their traditional police 
power to keep their citizenry safe.  Let us return to direct democracy.  
Much like capital punishment, gay marriage, and other controversial 
topics, the better approach may be to return the power of regulation to the 
states—the precise location the Founders would have, and did, approve. 
An Article V amendment is distinct from calling a full-fledged 
Article V convention, something this author currently opposes,245 but an 
option that Second Amendment scholars like Glenn T. Reynolds and 
Sanford Levinson welcome for other potential amendments.246  No doubt 
about it, an Article V amendment (in the singular) would be revolutionary.  
Few amendments have occurred outside the founding amendments and the 
Civil War amendments.247  The time has come to once again amend our 
                                                                                                                          
244 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
245 See generally Mary Margaret Penrose, Conventional Wisdom: Acknowledging Uncertainty in 
the Unknown, 78 TENN. L. REV. 789 (2011) (presenting the uncertainties surrounding the process of the 
untested Article V state convention process). 
246 See Sanford Levinson, Afterword: Full of Sound and Fury but Signifying Relatively Little?, 78 
TENN. L. REV. 867, 869 (2011) (“One might agree that explicit ‘amendatory adaptation’ is better than 
‘amendment by latitudinarian interpretation,’ but . . . a significant deficiency of the United States 
Constitution is that it is quite literally the most difficult to amend constitution in the entire world.”); 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Foreword: Divine Operating System?, 78 TENN. L. REV. 651, 653 (2011) 
(“[T]he Constitution has been effectively amended by judicial interpretations on numerous occasions 
. . . . If the Republic can face the risks of amendment via judicial action with equanimity, it can surely 
face the risks inherent in amendment via the procedures of Article V.”). 
247 See Timothy Lynch, Amending Article V to Make the Constitutional Amendment Process Itself 
Less Onerous, 78 TENN. L. REV. 823, 824 (2011) (“Over the past 224 years, the Constitution has been 
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Constitution.  The time has come to take twenty-seven words and turn 
them in to the Twenty-Eighth Amendment.    
VI.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:  AN IDEA THAT  
HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS 
“The text of the Second Amendment is maddeningly ambiguous.”248  
Americans are a curious lot.  We remain profoundly inconsistent in our 
support of an eighteenth-century Constitution that many criticize as 
outdated and incapable of responding to our modern needs such as 
abortion, gay marriage, and other issues.249  And, yet, we criticize the 
interpretation of this Constitution when federal courts, often including our 
Supreme Court, act to either find, or define, an individual right, such as the 
current trend of federal courts sanctioning same-sex marriage, that is at 
clear odds with state legislative pronouncements.  Under the status quo, we 
rely on an unelected Supreme Court to continually breathe life into this 
document, always remembering it is a Constitution they are expounding.250  
And many who criticize the Court speak of it as an activist body—a group 
of politically appointed judges that serve life terms often in anonymity.  
But, why wait for the Supreme Court to expound when we have the power 
to improve?251  Why rely on nine voices when we can include the voices of 
millions?  The Founders provided us a viable solution in Article V—a 
solution we have used to give us the Fourteenth Amendment, among 
others. 
All would hopefully admit that we will never be able to discern, with 
finality or confidence, what the Founders truly meant when crafting this 
singularly eternal document.  So why is it so difficult to envision a new 
Second Amendment, one that considers a world where blacks can never 
again be slaves, where Indians hold citizenship, and where women have 
rights outside the home and marriage?  Why do Americans fear 
abandoning this archaic Second Amendment in hopes of securing the 
elusive meanings of yesterday when we should be focusing on the 
                                                                                                                          
amended seventeen times.”).  The Civil War Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments—were ratified in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively.  Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/com
mon/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
248 Winkler, supra note 90. 
249 See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Op-Ed., Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 31, 2012, at A19 (arguing that Americans’ “insisten[t] . . . obedience to the Constitution” is the 
“culprit” causing American political dysfunction). 
250 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it 
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certainties of individual rights for law-abiding gun owners that exist and 
deserve protecting today?  The truth is that our Second Amendment is still 
vulnerable to judicial review and restriction.  The Founders could never 
have envisioned the world we live in and our modern conveniences, 
ranging from travel to communication to weaponry.  The political 
discourse was limited to the Federalist Papers and pamphlets while ours is 
expanded by Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 24-hour news media.  
Their Second Amendment is not suited for drones, M-4s, and nuclear arms 
any more than our defense is dependent upon militias, muskets, and 
flintlocks. 
 The Founders lived in a world without a professional police force and 
without the nation’s strongest army literally deployed throughout the 
world.  The Founders had slaves and plantations.  Modern Americans have 
email, DVRs, and unparalleled amenities.  Our worlds are so distinct that 
their concerns cannot possibly be our concerns.  The fears that motivated 
the Founders, such as the fear of a standing army, give modern Americans 
comfort and pride as we support our troops stationed across the globe.  We 
are much more than distant cousins; we are literally worlds apart. 
The time has come; in fact the time has passed, to reevaluate the 
Second Amendment and its applicability to the modern world.  We need a 
new, predictable way to protect the rights of law-abiding individuals to 
own and use guns.     
This author believes that we should consider using Article V to 
reformulate the Founders’ Second Amendment into a more workable 
modern amendment unquestionably securing the rights of lawful gun 
owners.  This author further believes that this amendment process should 
take place through the Article V process, firmly placed in the state 
legislative bodies rather than the continued refinement of gun rights, and 
other individual rights “expounded” through judicial review.   
The time has come to consider using the Article V process to replace 
the Second Amendment with a states’ rights approach.  The proposal seeks 
to enhance, rather than limit, law-abiding citizens’ rights to continue to 
own and use guns for hunting and self-protection.  The proposal is most 
decidedly individual and states’ rights focused.  At its core, this proposal 
considers who is best suited to determine what regulations, if any, should 
be applied to lawful gun ownership.  Should that power be placed with the 
state or federal government?  This author has less confidence in the 
Supreme Court than in the individual state legislatures.  Based on this 
belief, it is time to draft a modern Second Amendment that completely 
removes any notation to the militia and returns the power of regulation to 
the individual states.  Only in this way can we be confident that lawful gun 
ownership will remain a viable individual right in this country. 
 
